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I.

Introduction

Our tripartite system of government places responsibility for lawmaking
firmly in the legislative branch—and congressional overrides are the primary
means through which Congress signals disagreement with judicial interpretations of statutes. But in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,1 the
Supreme Court held that Congress’s partial codification and partial override
of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,2 a judicial decision interpreting the causation standard under Title VII, did not control the interpretation of analogous
language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),3 and
further that Congress’s “neglect[ing]” to amend the ADEA when it amended
Title VII should be interpreted as a clear signal that Congress intended the
language in the ADEA to be interpreted differently.4 Strikingly, the Court
did not even apply its own prior (partially overridden, partially codified)
precedent. Rather, the Court adopted the standard proposed by the dissent in
Price Waterhouse, an approach that was clearly disfavored by both Congress
and a majority of the Justices in the earlier case. The Gross Court’s
reasoning rests on the counterintuitive conclusion that Congress, in
expressing its disapproval of a judicial interpretation through enactment of an
override, embraced the application of that disfavored interpretation to other
statutes. Lower courts, following typical rules of statutory interpretation,
have quickly applied Gross to reinterpret the causation standard under
numerous other employment laws.5
The rule of interpretation that the Court announced in Gross is radically
asymmetrical. It permits a single judicial interpretation to spread readily
across multiple statutes but places upon Congress the burden of amending an

1. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
2. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
3. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (stating that the Court had “never” held that the “burdenshifting framework” endorsed by Congress’s post-Price Waterhouse amendments to Title VII was
applicable to ADEA claims and holding that “we decline to do so now”).
4. Id.
5. This has not been uniform, however. Courts have struggled to determine whether Gross,
Price Waterhouse, or the causation standard in Title VII should be applied. See infra Part V.
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uncertain, and constantly growing, group of statutes to end reliance on such a
single judicial interpretation. This approach improperly cabins the effects of
congressional overrides and dramatically aggrandizes the judicial role; it also
unmoors the Supreme Court from the rules of precedent that typically
constrain judicial interpretation. It distorts the separation of powers, making
it difficult for overrides to serve their intended role as a check on judicial
lawmaking, and causes significant confusion, inefficiency, and irregularity
within statutory law. It also increases the risk of ends-oriented judicial
interpretation.6
Gross has not been a popular decision. In the short time since it was
decided, several commentators have argued against the but-for causation
standard imposed by the Court7 on the normative ground that it makes it too
difficult for employees to prove that they were victims of discrimination in
situations where the employer’s action was based on a combination of
legitimate and illegitimate factors.8 Several also contend that, as a matter of
jurisprudence, the Court’s departure from Price Waterhouse was
unwarranted.9 The four dissenting Justices in Gross likewise argued that
Price Waterhouse should have controlled the interpretation of the ADEA and
that the test that the majority adopted was substantively problematic.10
My critique differs. I think that the Court’s approach in Gross was
fundamentally flawed; I also believe that simply following Price Waterhouse
would have been almost as troubling. Rather, I contend that the Court was
justified in revisiting the meaning of the ADEA’s statutory language—but
6. See infra subpart II(A) & Part VI.
7. Gross interpreted the ADEA’s prohibition on discrimination against an individual “because
of such individual’s age” to require a plaintiff to prove that age was the but-for cause of an adverse
employment action, even if that action was allegedly based on a mix of legitimate and illegitimate
factors. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006); Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350–51.
8. See, e.g., Michael Foreman, Gross v. FBL Financial Services—Oh So Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L.
REV. 681, 691–92 (2010) (arguing that plaintiffs lack access to relevant evidence needed to prove
but-for causation in mixed-motive cases); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV.
857, 881 (2010) (contending that any form of causation standard is difficult for antidiscrimination
plaintiffs to meet because the relevant evidence remains in the defendant’s control but that “proving
but-for causation is particularly difficult”); cf. Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in
Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 133–39 (2010) (arguing that Congress should adopt a
more lenient “contributing cause” standard for all employment discrimination statutes).
9. For examples of post-Gross commentary arguing that Price Waterhouse should have
controlled the interpretation of analogous language in the ADEA, see Harper, supra note 8, at 107–
08; Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Labor and Employment
Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 270 (2009); Katz, supra note 8, at 870–71; and
Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions,
51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 288–315 (2010). In earlier work, predating Gross, Professor Katz argued that
lower courts could legitimately depart from Price Waterhouse to adopt a “unified” approach
somewhat similar to that which I am proposing. Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment
(Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 659–81 (2008) [hereinafter Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment].
10. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2354–57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Price Waterhouse
should govern the ADEA); id. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that proving but-for
causation is very difficult for plaintiffs).
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that in doing so, it should have applied a rebuttable presumption that the
language of the ADEA be interpreted consistent with the meaning that
Congress signaled it preferred for analogous language in Title VII.11 My
proposal builds on prior work that I and others have done regarding the particular challenge posed by the interpretation of “related” employment
discrimination statutes following congressional overrides.12 Writing prior to
Gross, commentators discussed this question as a binary choice: should
courts apply the overridden precedent—what I have called the “shadow
precedent”—or the interpretation endorsed in the new legislative language?
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the same issue arises even in the interpretation of a single statute when courts are faced with substantive questions
that are similar to the issue addressed in an overridden case but not squarely
addressed by the text of the override.13
Gross dramatically changed the terms of debate by following neither the
precedent nor the override. The Court asserted that because the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (1991 CRA), which amended Title VII to partially codify and
partially override Price Waterhouse, did not explicitly address the causation
standard in the ADEA, Congress must have intended that the statutes impose
different standards.14 I believe this conclusion is unwarranted. As a
descriptive matter, I think it mischaracterizes the proper inference to be
drawn from Congress’s prior actions (and inactions). Although actual
congressional “intent” may be impossible to verify, consideration of the
overall structure of the 1991 CRA, as well as of legislative history, provides
strong support for the opposite inference—i.e., that Congress expected that
courts would apply its preferred causation standard to other
antidiscrimination statutes that have substantive language similar to

11. In Price Waterhouse, the plurality and concurring opinions interpreted Title VII’s
prohibition on discrimination “because of” an individual’s sex to establish liability if a plaintiff
proved sex was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in a decision based on a mix of legitimate and
illegitimate factors, unless an employer could prove that it would have taken the same action
without considering sex. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242, 250 (1989) (plurality
opinion); id. at 259–61 (White, J., concurring); id. at 276, 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O’Connor interpreted Title VII to permit shifting the burden to the defendant only when a plaintiff
had “direct evidence” of discrimination. Id. at 276. Shortly after Price Waterhouse was decided,
Congress amended Title VII to codify the motivating-factor standard and to replace the affirmative
defense articulated in Price Waterhouse with a limitation on remedies. Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075–76 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(m), 2000e5-(g)(B) (2006)).
12. This prior work includes Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of
Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009);
Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated
View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000); Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t
Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093 (1993); Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 9; and
Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217 (2007).
13. Widiss, supra note 12, at 542–46, 551–56.
14. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (“We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s
relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.”).
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Title VII.15 But I am not advocating use of legislative history to trump or go
beyond the statutory language. The text of the ADEA can comfortably be
interpreted to adopt the same causation standard as that endorsed by
Congress in its amendment of Title VII.16 Accordingly, the Court’s rejection
of that standard—in the absence of any affirmative indication from Congress
that it intended the ADEA to be governed by a different standard—
unnecessarily undermines jurisprudential values of fairness, efficiency, and
predictability within statutory law.17 It also increases the risk of ideological
judging by interpreting overrides to have the anomalous effect of granting
courts freedom from the constraints typically imposed by precedent and by
Congress. (Notably, Gross is an employer-favoring decision issued by a
sharply divided Court, with the five “conservative” Justices making up the
majority.)18
Lower courts have already applied the reasoning in Gross to reinterpret
the causation standard governing at least ten different federal statutory prohibitions on employment discrimination or retaliation, as well as the standard
governing state analogues of several federal statutes.19 Courts, however,
have not been uniform in applying Gross to other statutes. Some have
continued to follow Price Waterhouse, and a few have applied the standard
set forth by Congress in its override of Price Waterhouse.20 The one
consistent theme in all of these decisions is that the current law is confused.
Gross and its aftermath are illustrative of a more general problem that I
call the “hydra problem.” Congress tried, through enacting an override, to
supersede a judicial interpretation with which it disagreed. The Court interpreted this action—the metaphorical severing of a head—to permit the rapid
growth of new “heads” in numerous other statutes. In Gross, the Court
suggested that if Congress did not intend this result, it bore the burden of
amending not just the statute actually interpreted in a prior decision but also
all related statutes to which the disfavored judicial interpretation might be
applied. I contend this is an unreasonable expectation. Even if Congress

15. See infra subpart III(D).
16. See infra subpart IV(B).
17. See infra Part V.
18. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346, 2352, 2358 (indicating that the majority decision was
authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and
Scalia, while Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter dissented); see also Jeffrey Rosen,
Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html (documenting the rise of “pro-business” decisions under the
Roberts Court).
19. See infra subparts V(A)–(B) (discussing court decisions applying Gross to the
antiretaliation provisions of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act,
§ 1981, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
the Jury Systems Improvement Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, § 1983 claims
raising public employees’ First Amendment rights, and state analogues of several of these federal
statutes).
20. See infra subparts V(A)–(B).
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could accurately identify all potentially affected statutes, it would face significant barriers in amending them all separately. Shortly after Gross was
decided, Congress considered bills that would override the decision by
inserting language into the ADEA that would not only reject the Court’s
interpretation of the causation standard in the ADEA but also articulate a
uniform causation standard that ostensibly would govern all other federal
statutory or constitutional prohibitions on employment discrimination or
retaliation; significantly, however, the bills did not propose actually
amending any other statutes.21 In light of Gross, this kind of “blanket”
amendment is reasonable, but it is far from ideal. It might well be inadequately responsive to distinctions among statutes; it would also mean that
language governing the causation standard of numerous statutes would be
buried in the sections of the U.S. Code that codify the ADEA. In part
because of these potential costs, even if Congress amended the ADEA to
override Gross, it is relatively unlikely that it would enact a global override
or separately amend all other potentially affected statutes. But this would not
necessarily mean that Congress “chooses” or “prefers” that a standard of
causation it affirmatively repudiated apply to other statutes; rather, I argue
that it means that the terms by which the Gross Court requires Congress to
signal such disagreement fail to respect adequately the institutional realities
of Congress.
The anomaly of statutory interpretation is that courts, which in this
context serve putatively as agents of Congress, set the rules for the judicial–
congressional conversation through the canons of interpretation they adopt.22
If courts employ canons that place expectations on Congress that are clearly
unrealistic, they can work to undermine the promise of legislative supremacy
in the statutory realm. The Gross Court justified its conclusion that Congress
“chose” a different causation standard for the ADEA than Title VII by
drawing a negative inference from Congressional inaction. I argue that
inference is unwarranted.23 I propose instead a rebuttable presumption that

21. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009). The two bills were substantively identical.
22. Numerous state legislatures have enacted statutes that seek to govern how courts interpret
statutes, some with greater success than others. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the
Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (cataloguing rules of interpretation enacted
by state legislatures and discussing the extent to which they control judicial interpretations).
Commentators disagree about the constitutionality of comparable action by Congress. See infra
note 383.
23. See infra subpart VI(A). In other contexts, courts and commentators have long recognized
that congressional inaction is often a dubious basis for inferring Congressional intent. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496 (1997) (“[W]e have frequently cautioned that it is at best
treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.”)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that relying on “congressional inaction” to signal
acquiescence to a prior judicial opinion “is a canard”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting
Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 90–108 (1988) (discussing concerns with inferring
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enactment of an override calls for the (re)interpretation of the preexisting
language in the statute amended—and analogous provisions in related
statutes—consistent with the meaning endorsed by Congress, so long as the
preexisting text can reasonably bear that meaning.24 Importantly, the rule I
propose only comes into play when an override endorses a plausible
interpretation of preexisting statutory language. Thus a textualist jurist who
categorically refuses to consider legislative history could comfortably apply
this rule. It would promote the fair, efficient, and predictable development of
statutory law, while still permitting courts to consider whether significant
differences among statutes that are unrelated to the override merit distinct
interpretations. Given the challenge of amending multiple statutes, I believe
it would also be more likely to accord with legislative intent. That said, I
also suggest that Congress make its intentions as clear as possible in duly
enacted statutory language.
Part II explores the challenge that overrides pose to the standard rule of
precedent and defines the hydra problem. Part III discusses in detail the
multistep conversation between the courts and Congress regarding the standard of causation in employment discrimination statutes. Part IV imagines
an alternative version of the story to illustrate how the conventions courts use
to interpret overrides improperly minimize the significance of congressional
interventions relative to judicial interpretations. Part V uses the rapid application of Gross in other contexts, as well as bills Congress has considered to
override Gross, to argue that the putative response that the Gross Court indicates it expects from Congress is unreasonably difficult for Congress to
achieve. Moreover, even if it were viable, it could cause significant new
problems. Part VI argues that courts should instead adopt interpretive rules
that more fairly respect the institutional realities of Congress; this would
better permit overrides to play their expected role as a means for Congress to
signal disagreement with judicial interpretations of statutes and further the
orderly and consistent development of statutory law.
A note about scope and audience may be helpful. This Article identifies
a problem of statutory interpretation that has arisen frequently in the
employment discrimination context and posits that it is a latent tension
inherent in the interpretation of overrides more generally. My hope is that
the analysis that follows will be of interest both to scholars of statutory interpretation and to those who focus on employment discrimination law, as well
as to practitioners of employment discrimination law, courts, and policy
makers. But as is true of any case study, richness of detail comes at the
cost of breadth of coverage. Moreover, as discussed more fully below,
acquiescence from inaction, including the possibility that Congress does not know about the
relevant decision, has higher priorities than responding to it, or cannot agree on an appropriate
response).
24. This rule could be announced by the Supreme Court as a general canon of interpretation. It
is also possible that Congress could enact legislation directing courts to adopt this presumption. See
infra note 406 and accompanying text.
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employment discrimination is a particularly fertile ground for exploration of
these issues because there are numerous statutes that are typically deemed
“related,” overrides are common, and it is a highly partisan area of the law.
For all these reasons, employment discrimination may also be somewhat
atypical; perhaps it is a “perfect storm” for the development of the hydra
problem. I believe that the approach I advocate could be applied when interpreting the significance of overrides in other areas of law. However, further
research is warranted to better understand the extent to which the hydra
problem exists in other contexts as well as appropriate responses to it.
II.

Precedent and Overrides

In statutory interpretation cases, courts routinely extol the importance of
precedent and look to prior interpretations of legislative language to resolve
the case at bar. Scholarly commentary on the application of the rule of
precedent in the statutory context has focused on the all-or-nothing questions
of whether and when courts may properly overrule their own statutory
precedents.25 Questions regarding how courts determine whether a valid
statutory precedent controls a different case, particularly when that case arose
under a different statute, and the related question of how congressional
overrides fit into the standard rule of precedent, have been far less
considered. This part lays out the conceptual challenges that are implicit in
the interpretation of overrides and can create the hydra problem. It shows
how Congress’s enactment of an override can be interpreted to have the
counterintuitive effect of aggrandizing contemporary judicial power to
reinterpret numerous other statutes, as illustrated by the detailed case study
that follows. Part VI then returns to theoretical issues discussed in this part
to question more directly the assumptions and presumptions that underlie

25. Compare, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 23 (1949)
(“Therefore it seems better to say that once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has been
made, and in that sense a direction has been fixed within the gap of ambiguity, the court should take
that direction as given.”), and Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 208–09, 215 (1989) (arguing for
absolute statutory stare decisis as a means of reducing judicial lawmaking), with WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 52–55 (1994) (arguing that when the
assumptions of a society or culture underlying a statute are discredited, the statute may be
interpreted dynamically in order to fulfill its original functions), T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating
Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 46–47 (1988) (arguing that a “nautical” approach to
statutory construction that takes into account the current legal landscape and is not bound by
originalism is both sensible and defensible), and Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2074–75 (2002) (arguing that courts should, at times, be
willing to overrule statutory precedents to bring an interpretation in line with contemporary political
preferences). Distinct issues may arise when considering statutory stare decisis at the circuit court
level. See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 317, 344–47 (2005) (arguing that heightened statutory stare decisis for circuit court decisions
is unwarranted because Congress is less likely to know about or prioritize responding to circuit
court decisions than to Supreme Court decisions).
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them and to propose an alternative approach that better respects the
separation of powers and the orderly development of statutory law.
A. Statutory Interpretation Constrained by Precedent
The basic workings of a rule of precedent are quite familiar. Under
traditional common law principles, in the absence of statutory or
constitutional directives, judges reason from a body of prior cases to resolve
a contemporary dispute. In so doing, they must determine what the
underlying rationale is for the prior decisions and whether the case at bar is
relevantly similar to the prior cases such that it should be governed by the
same rationale.26 This approach furthers fairness (in that similar cases are
treated alike), efficiency, and predictability—values that are generally
considered important in the rule of law.27 As Justice Brandeis famously
observed, “Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right.”28 Still, notwithstanding respect for precedent, common law
courts reconsider prior precedents in response to changing needs or evolving
norms; often, this occurs gradually as prior decisions are distinguished and
new decisions slowly accumulate until ultimately a high court announces a
new rule.29 In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court has likewise
permitted relatively flexible standards for overruling prior precedents, in
large part because it is so difficult to amend the Constitution.30
In conducting statutory analysis, precedent plays a similar, but not
identical, role. Statutes contain gaps and ambiguities, and often there can be
more than one “reasonable” interpretation of statutory language.31 Once a

26. For general discussions of the system of precedent, see, for example, PRECEDENT IN LAW
(Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); Eric Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367 (1988);
and Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). A symposium on precedent and
the Roberts Court offers an interesting collection of more recent research on precedent from a
variety of perspectives. Symposium, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008).
27. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred
course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, [and it] fosters reliance on judicial decisions . . . .”); Schauer, supra note 26, at 595–601
(observing that reasons for following precedent include fairness, predictability, and efficiency).
28. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
29. See, e.g., Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 450, 470 (Md. 2003) (holding that abrogation
of the common law rule of spousal immunity was warranted because it was a “vestige of the past
[and] no longer suitable to our people” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
30. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1362 (1988) (“The Court applies a relaxed, or weaker, form of that presumption when it reconsiders
its constitutional precedents, because the difficulty of amending the Constitution makes the Court
the only effective resort for changing obsolete constitutional doctrine.”).
31. Courts are instructed to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguity in a
statute if they determine Congress intends the agency to act with the force of law and that the
agency in fact did so. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)
(“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
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court with precedential authority has issued an interpretation, that interpretation is expected to control future interpretation of that language by courts that
are inferior in the judicial hierarchy, at least when they are faced with questions that are relevantly similar to the issue posed in the precedential case.32
The Supreme Court and circuit courts also typically consider themselves
bound by their own prior statutory precedents, although, as discussed below,
the Supreme Court has not adopted a rule of absolute statutory stare decisis.33
The significant respect given to prior interpretations, particularly those
of the Supreme Court, means that judicial glosses on the meaning of statutory
terms become functionally part of the “law,” even though they are not found
in the actual statutory language. Later court decisions expound upon the
prior interpretation, frequently providing new glosses, not on the statutory
text itself but on authoritative interpretations of that text. This is true not just
for statutes that the Supreme Court has designated “common law” statutes,
such as the Sherman Antitrust Act, but for statutes more generally.34 For
example, in the employment discrimination context, the Supreme Court
announced a multipart test to govern whether an employee has an actionable
harassment claim.35 The elements of the test are not found in the statutory
language, but courts have since developed a significant body of case law that
parses the language that the Court used and reasons by analogy from prior
the exercise of that authority.”); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to
the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”). In practice, courts retain considerable flexibility regarding whether they will defer. See
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098
(2008) (“[O]ur study of the 1014 agency-interpretation cases from Chevron to Hamdan reveals that
the Court’s deference practice functions along a continuum, ranging from an anti-deference regime
reflected in the rule of lenity to the super-strong deference the Court sometimes announces in cases
related to foreign affairs.”).
32. See, e.g., Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1161–62 (2005)
(discussing the hierarchical application of precedent).
33. See id. (stating that while both the Supreme Court and circuit courts typically follow their
own precedents, they are not legally required to do so); see also infra note 45 and accompanying
text.
34. For an interesting exploration of how “common law” statutes differ from other statutes (if at
all), see Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive Methodology and Delegations to Courts: Are “CommonLaw Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2012) (on file with author).
35. The Court announced this standard in two decisions handed down on the same day that
include the same precise language. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)
(“An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the
employee . . . [unless an employer can establish] (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”); Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765
(1998) (repeating the test in identical language).
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judicial decisions to determine the test’s scope.36 Although the Court stated
that this test was an “interpretation” of the basic statutory prohibition on
discrimination as informed in part by the consideration of principles of
agency law,37 the actual development of the doctrine would be hard to distinguish from common law. To lawyers trained in the United States, this may
be so familiar as to seem inherent in the process of statutory interpretation.
But in some civil code societies, at least as a formal matter, statutory interpretation decisions hold no precedential value.38 Rather, the only controlling
“law” is the statutory text itself.39
As a jurisprudential principle, the Supreme Court and lower courts
describe the rule of precedent as an important constraint in statutory
interpretation.40 Numerous empirical studies have tried to gauge how
effectively precedent actually constrains judges from issuing decisions in line
with their ideological preferences.41 (As discussed below, empirical research

36. Courts frequently disagree about the correct interpretation of aspects of this judicially
created standard. Compare, e.g., Monteagudo v. Asociación de Empleados del Estado Libre
Asociado de P.R., 554 F.3d 164, 171–72 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that it was not “unreasonable” as a
matter of law for an employee to fail to file a sexual harassment complaint when the manager who
handled complaints was a close friend of the alleged harasser), with Barrett v. Applied Radiant
Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding in a similar situation that it was
unreasonable for an employee to fail to report harassment).
37. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755 (arguing that the Court’s newly developed discrimination rule
was not purely discretionary “common law” but rather “statutory interpretation pursuant to
congressional direction”).
38. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 234 (1999)
(asserting that judges in civilian jurisdictions are “just interpreters” whose decisions are only final
for a particular case and are not authoritative in other cases, even similar ones). For case studies on
the use of precedent in several civil code countries, see generally INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS
(D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997). The editors of this volume suggest that
increasingly in civil code countries, prior judicial interpretations of statutory language can exert
influence, even if they are not technically binding as precedent. See D. Neil MacCormick &
Robert S. Summers, Further General Reflections and Conclusions, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS,
supra, at 531, 531–33, 536 (suggesting that though significant differences remain, the treatment of
precedent in civil and common law countries has converged in the modern era so that it is of
increasing importance in civil law jurisdictions).
39. See Michel Troper & Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, in INTERPRETING
PRECEDENTS, supra note 38, at 103, 107 (stating that in France, “[t]he only legitimate source of law
is ‘the law’, which is equated with statutory law”).
40. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (calling stare decisis
an “indisputable . . . self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch” that carries “special force
in the area of statutory interpretation”).
41. This debate is often characterized as between adherents to an “attitudinal model,” who
argue that judges are heavily influenced by their ideological preferences, and adherents to a “legal
model,” who argue that judges are in fact constrained by precedent, statutory language, and
congressional intent. See Kirk A. Randozzo et al., Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of
Congressional Statutes on Judicial Behavior, 68 J. POL. 1006, 1008 (2006) (describing this debate
and collecting studies that provide evidence for each theory). There is empirical work on each side
of the debate. For a study substantiating the attitudinal model by showing that, at least as far as the
Supreme Court is concerned, ideological preferences play a significant role in decision making, see
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002). For a study empirically testing the effect of regime-changing Supreme Court
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also seeks to establish the extent to which strategic considerations, such as
the likelihood of overrides, also play a role.)42 Results are mixed, but recent
studies typically conclude that both ideology and rule-of-law values, such as
adherence to precedent, play a role in judicial decisions at all levels, with the
general consensus that the Supreme Court is less constrained by precedent
than lower courts.43 In part, this reflects doctrinal distinctions. The Court
permits itself to overrule even statutory decisions if they prove “unworkable”
or become “obsolete” due to intervening changes in the law.44 However, the
Court typically opines that stare decisis should be observed particularly
strictly in the statutory context because Congress may intervene to supersede
prior judicial interpretations, and only rarely does the Court explicitly
overturn statutory precedents.45 The more significant difference between the
Supreme Court and lower courts is the Supreme Court’s willingness to
distinguish precedents that many would expect to control a given case.46
decisions and finding that the Justices’ voting is at least somewhat constrained by precedent, see
Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision
Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305 (2002).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 79–80.
43. See, e.g., Lindquist & Cross, supra note 32, at 1173 (asserting that precedential power is
weakest at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court); see also Madeline Fleisher, Judicial Decision
Making Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS L. REV.
919, 920–21 nn.3–5 (2008) (collecting and describing studies that seek to document the constraining
effect of precedent relative to ideology). Much of the early work in the field focused on the
Supreme Court’s consideration of constitutional cases; more recently, lower courts and statutory
precedents have received greater attention. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An
Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District Court
Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 77 (2009) (finding that district courts’ propensity to follow
precedent is influenced by their own ideology but not by anticipated ideology of the appellate court
that will review their decisions); Lindquist & Cross, supra note 32, at 1195–96 (finding that
statutory precedent exerted influence on lower court judges but that its constraining effects
weakened over time); Chad Westerland et al., Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891, 901–02 (2010) (finding that circuit courts are
constrained by the expected treatment of precedent by the contemporary Supreme Court as well as
by prior treatment of that precedent in their own circuit).
44. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73 (noting that although prior statutory interpretations are
given greater deference than constitutional ones, the Court will overrule a prior statutory precedent
that has proven unworkable in practice).
45. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 280–84 (1972) (adhering to precedents excluding
professional baseball from antitrust regulation, despite widespread criticism of the prior decisions,
on the ground that Congress had signaled agreement with the Court’s interpretation by failing to
enact legislation overriding those decisions); see also Barrett, supra note 25, at 319–21 (discussing
Flood as an example of the Supreme Court’s heightened deference to statutory precedent); James F.
Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63
J. POL. 1091, 1097, 1107 (2001) (providing an empirical study of cases from 1946 to 1995 and
finding that the Court is less likely to overrule statutory precedent than constitutional precedent,
although both statutory and constitutional precedents are more likely to be overruled when
“ideologically incongruent” with the contemporary Court).
46. Cf. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 191–92 (1988) (arguing that, at least as to constitutional principles, judges can “assemble
diverse precedents into whatever pattern” they choose). Although lower courts also enjoy some
flexibility regarding how broadly or narrowly they interpret Supreme Court precedent, studies
suggest the expected preference of the contemporary Supreme Court plays a significant role in
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Additionally, individual Justices may simply continue to adhere to their
original position through a series of dissents.47 Notwithstanding these
caveats, it is probably fair to say that precedent exerts control over statutory
interpretation even at the Supreme Court level, in part because the Court also
cares about its own institutional legitimacy.48 Thus, as Professor Lawrence
Marshall expressed it, a court’s distinguishing of precedent must at least pass
the “red face test.”49
B. Statutory Interpretation Constrained by Precedent Interpreting a
“Related” Statute
Precedent interpreting one statute can also exert influence on the
interpretation of other statutes. Courts often state that in “related” statutes,
identical or similar language should maintain consistent meanings. Thus, for
statutes that are identified as in pari materia (in the same matter),50 courts
will apply prior judicial interpretations not just to subsequent cases that arise
under the statute actually interpreted but also to identical or similar language
in other statutes addressing similar issues.51 Courts offer a variety of
sometimes-overlapping justifications for this practice.52 These include that
Congress intends to incorporate authoritative interpretations of statutory text
when it uses language from one statute in a related context;53 that similar

lower courts’ decision making. See, e.g., Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event
History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL.
534, 546–47 (2002) (finding that the ideology of the contemporary Supreme Court is a more
important factor than the ideology of the circuit court panel in determining whether that panel will
comply with new Supreme Court precedent overruling prior Supreme Court precedent); Westerland
et al., supra note 43, at 901 (finding strong empirical support for the contention that circuit courts’
compliance with precedent depends on their expectations regarding whether the contemporary
Supreme Court would be constrained by the prior precedent).
47. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 38 (1999) (describing how certain
Justices sometimes follow a pattern of “strong[ly] preferential” voting, registering their continued
rejection of a precedent by authoring a dissent in each successor case).
48. See Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53
AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 972–73 (2009) (collecting studies demonstrating that “courts have preferences
for institutional legitimacy”).
49. Marshall, supra note 25, at 218; see also Richards & Kritzer, supra note 41, at 315 (2002)
(“Law matters in Supreme Court decision making in ways that are specifically jurisprudential. . . .
We theorize and observe that both the justices’ policy goals and legal considerations matter in
Supreme Court decision making.”).
50. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009).
51. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1066 (4th ed. 2007) (introducing the “in pari
materia” rule as one of three canons of statutory construction under which an interpreter of a statute
may look to other statutes for interpretive guidance); CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 486–89 (2011) (discussing the canon).
52. See NELSON, supra note 51, at 487–88 (describing purpose-based, text-based, and intentbased rationales for interpreting statutes in pari materia consistently).
53. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (stating, in the context of the thenrecently enacted ADEA, that “where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of

872

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 90:859

language within the statutes should be interpreted consistently so as to
achieve purposes that are shared by both statutes;54 and simply that the plain
meaning of identical text will typically remain constant among related
statutes.55
The intent-based rationales, in particular, rest on assumptions that are
difficult to verify. As a threshold matter, it can be difficult to guess ex ante
which statutes courts will determine to be “related,” particularly because
statutes may be deemed related for some purposes but not for others. For
example, the Supreme Court has stated that the ADEA’s substantive provisions governing private employment are derived in haec verba (verbatim)56
from Title VII, and should generally be interpreted in pari materia with that
statute, but that its procedural and remedial provisions borrow from the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and accordingly should follow interpretations
of FLSA.57 Confusingly, however, the Court later opined that almost identical procedural language found in a separate portion of the ADEA governing
federal employment should be interpreted in pari materia with Title VII.58
Even if Congress would reasonably assume that statutes would be deemed in
pari materia, legislative drafters may not be aware of relevant judicial
interpretations of the preexisting statute.59 Assertions of “intent” are
particularly dubious when courts borrow interpretations that postdate the
enactment of the related statute.60 Importantly, however, sometimes when
intent-based rationales are weak, purposivist or textualist justifications may
offer strong support for applying a consistent interpretation.61 The opposite
is also true. Sometimes an assessment of statutory purpose or context can

a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given
to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute”).
54. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (citing the “common
purpose” of the ADEA and Title VII as partial justification for interpreting the statutes
consistently).
55. See, e.g., id. (citing the almost-identical text of the ADEA and Title VII as partial
justification for interpreting them consistently).
56. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 853 (9th ed. 2009).
57. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584–85.
58. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1981) (stating that in addressing age
discrimination in federal employment, “Congress deliberately prescribed a distinct statutory scheme
applicable only to the federal sector, and one based not on the FLSA but . . . on Title VII” (footnote
omitted)).
59. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 72–76 (1997) (describing a study that
found that congressional staffers were mostly unaware of how circuit courts were interpreting
statutes). But see infra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing studies showing that many
Supreme Court and circuit court decisions are discussed in some manner in Congress).
60. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 260 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(criticizing the plurality opinion for applying a 1971 interpretation of Title VII to the ADEA,
enacted in 1967).
61. See, e.g., id. at 235–40 (plurality opinion) (citing purpose-based, textual, and agencydeference justifications for applying to the ADEA an interpretation of Title VII that postdated the
ADEA’s enactment).
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suggest strong reasons for interpreting identical text to bear different
meanings.62
Whether or not Congress intentionally borrows judicial interpretations,
the practice of interpreting identical or similar language in statutes in pari
materia to bear consistent meanings will often have the independent virtue of
advancing the values served by precedent in a true common law context.
That is, it will often promote fairness—in the sense of treating similar issues
alike—to interpret distinct statutes that address related subjects (e.g., age
discrimination and race discrimination) consistently. The practice will also
typically promote efficiency and predictability. This is particularly essential
because the Supreme Court and state supreme courts rule on any given statute relatively infrequently. For example, it has been almost fifty years since
Title VII was enacted, and many other federal and state statutes have since
been enacted that use similar language to prohibit discrimination in
employment.63 In that half century, the Supreme Court has directly
addressed the standard of causation that should be applied to claims alleging
a mix of legitimate and illegitimate motives just twice: Price Waterhouse
(interpreting Title VII) and Gross (interpreting the ADEA). If lower courts
lack an authoritative construction of the statute actually at issue in a given
case, they naturally rely on authoritative interpretations of analogous
language in related statutes. This is illustrated by the rapid exportation of the
rule of causation announced in Gross, as well as the pre-Gross exportation of
the rule of causation announced in Price Waterhouse.64 If lawyers practicing
in a given area can reasonably expect lower courts to do so, they likewise can
have a good sense of how statutes will be applied and can advise their clients
accordingly.
The “meaningful-variation” canon of statutory interpretation is the
converse of interpreting statutes in pari materia consistently; courts assume
that a difference between statutes that are otherwise similar is a purposeful
signal by Congress that the statutes should bear distinctly different meanings
on the relevant point.65 At times, this conclusion is reasonable, particularly
when language in the statute is specific enough to establish that Congress
intended the distinction to be significant.66 But in the absence of legislative

62. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 522–25 (1994) (interpreting language in
the Copyright Act regarding attorneys’ fees differently from almost identical language in civil rights
statutes in order to further distinct purposes). Of course, many would argue that these statutes are
not in pari materia at all.
63. See infra notes 269–76 and accompanying text.
64. See infra subparts V(A)–(B).
65. See, e.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 88–92 (1991) (arguing that the
existence of several statutes explicitly permitting the recovery of experts’ and attorneys’ fees
required interpreting a statute that only explicitly referenced “attorney’s fees” to preclude recovery
of experts’ fees).
66. For example, Congress recently enacted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 (GINA), Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Although the basic structure of GINA’s substantive employment discrimination provisions
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language establishing purposive distinctions, the inference of intentionality
may often be unwarranted. For example, the variation may be a response to
political calculations that have salience at the time that the later statute is
enacted but were absent when the first statute was enacted, or congressional
drafters may not even realize that the later statute largely echoes but differs
in some way from an earlier statute or a different section of the same statute.
The Court has recognized this concern, stating that the inference will be
strong when “applied . . . to contrasting statutory sections originally enacted
simultaneously in relevant respects” but should be applied more cautiously
when there is less reason to infer that the difference is deliberate.67 As discussed more fully below, I contend that generally it is improper to infer a
“meaningful” variation when the distinction between otherwise similar statutes is created by language added to a given statute to override (or codify)
prior judicial interpretations of that statute.68 Additionally, whether or not
the inference of intentionality is warranted in a given situation, application of
this canon of interpretation does far less than interpreting similar statutes in
pari materia consistently to advance predictability or uniformity in the law
because it is often difficult for lower courts, lawyers, and the public to guess
what significance higher courts will ascribe to variation among statutes.
It is also essential to distinguish the canon of interpreting statutes in pari
materia consistently from what is sometimes called the “whole code” canon
of statutory interpretation.69 This is a more general—and far more
controversial—proposition that statutory terms should bear consistent
meaning across the U.S. Code as a whole. As a descriptive matter, it is far
less likely that this approach accords with any true congressional “intent”
since it strains credibility to suggest that in crafting or voting on new
legislation, congressional lawmakers consider not just interpretations of
closely related statutes but also interpretations of similar language used in
radically different statutory contexts. As Judge Posner memorably observed,
“Congressmen do not carry the statutes of the United States around in their
heads any more than judges do.”70 Nor is it reasonable to assume that stat-

borrows from Title VII, GINA explicitly precludes interpreting that language to permit “disparate
impact” causes of action and authorizes the creation of a commission to study whether disparate
impact claims should be permitted in the future. Id. § 208, 122 Stat. at 917–18.
67. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (emphasis added).
68. See infra subpart VI(A).
69. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 863 (describing a “whole code rule” under which
“interpreters must consider the provision in light of the whole code as well as the whole statute”);
see also William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 171, 221 (2000) (describing Justice Scalia’s assertions that courts should interpret statutes so
as to “ensure some coherence across the whole body of law”); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory
Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 221, 225–26 (2010) (reporting an empirical study of recent cases finding a theoretical divide
between Justices who prioritize coherence across the legal landscape and those that aim for best
effectuating the policy embodied in a particular statute).
70. Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 516 (7th Cir. 1989).
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utes addressing very different areas of law share purposes; for example, the
objectives of an antidiscrimination law will not necessarily be furthered by
interpreting language in the same way that similar language has been interpreted in a criminal statute or a securities law. The whole code canon of
interpretation also does very little to support predictability and uniformity
because it is all but impossible to guess where a court will turn.
The whole code canon is frequently invoked by jurists who ascribe to
“textualist” modes of interpretation and claim that they constrain judicial
activism.71 But as Professor William Buzbee argues persuasively, whole
code interpretation can actually facilitate, rather than constrain, ends-oriented
judging.72 The U.S. Code is so vast, and the body of judicial decisions interpreting it is so immense, that a determined jurist could likely find support for
several different interpretations of a given term and could choose among
them to advance ideological preferences. (As discussed in more detail
below, the majority opinion in Gross is arguably a good example of this.
The Court draws its interpretation of the ADEA from judicial interpretations
of language in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).73 Neither of these
statutes is an obvious or predictable source of meaning for an employment
discrimination statute.) Thus, to paraphrase the oft-quoted criticism of
reliance on legislative history, whole code interpretation can be like looking
over a crowd and picking out your friends.74
C. Statutory Interpretation Constrained by Congressional Overrides
As I have discussed more fully elsewhere, both courts and
commentators routinely cite the possibility that Congress can enact overrides
to supersede judicial interpretation of statutes as a check on the lawmaking
inherent in statutory interpretation.75 This is deemed a crucial mechanism of
maintaining legislative supremacy in the statutory realm.76 Legal commentators frequently characterize overrides as a helpful “colloquy” between the
courts and Congress; courts, acting as agents of Congress in this context,
engage in a good-faith effort to interpret statutes in line with legislative intent
71. See Buzbee, supra note 69, at 230 (“[J]ustices most frequently utilizing [the whole code
canon] are self-avowed textualists.”).
72. See id. at 239 (explaining that “[m]ere text-to-text comparisons . . . provide virtually no
constraining data points that a judge must evaluate and explain in reaching a result” and arguing
that, consequently, “[t]he universe of ostensibly similar statutory provisions—frequently a huge
universe—is putty for judicial molding”).
73. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009) (citing Bridge v. Phoenix
Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131 (2008), and Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201
(2007), cases addressing RICO and FCRA, respectively).
74. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal as
observing that citing legislative history is like “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends”).
75. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 518–23 (collecting and discussing commentary).
76. Id. at 520.
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and welcome “corrections” from Congress when appropriate.77 Public choice
scholars, by contrast, often characterize the Supreme Court (at least) as a
political actor in its own right but likewise suggest that the possibility of
override serves as an important limit on courts.78 Some empirical studies
support the contention that courts interpret statutes to effectuate their own
policy preferences insofar as they can do so without triggering an override,79
although other studies have found little or no evidence that such strategic
considerations determine outcomes.80
The efficacy of overrides as a tool of legislative supremacy depends on
two assumptions. The first is that Congress pays attention to judicial
decisions. Although, as noted above, studies suggest that Congress may miss
some significant statutory interpretation decisions,81 it is also true that many
of the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions and significant circuit court
statutory decisions are discussed in some manner in Congress.82 In an
influential study, Professor William Eskridge found that each Congress
typically overrides about a dozen Supreme Court decisions and about twice
as many lower court decisions.83 Other studies have found comparable
results.84 The second assumption is that overrides effectively constrain
judicial activism. A study by political scientist Jeb Barnes found that even

77. Id. at 521. The term colloquy is from Professor Richard Paschal. Richard A. Paschal, The
Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the Supreme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143, 143
(1991).
78. See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
263, 265 (1990) (arguing that “the behavior of the Court can be understood as that of a selfinterested, politically motivated actor” but that the Court is constrained by “[t]he ability of other
political actors to take actions to reverse [it]”).
79. See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The
Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 260–63 (2003) (concluding that both ideology
and politics seem to affect Supreme Court decision making and asserting that “the conclusion that
the Court thinks strategically cannot be rejected”); Thomas G. Hansford & David F. Damore,
Congressional Preferences, Perceptions of Threat, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 28 AM.
POL. Q. 490, 504–05 (2000) (finding, in certain circumstances, that the Court is constrained by
expectations regarding whether Congress will override judicial decisions).
80. See Clark, supra note 48, at 972 (reviewing studies and concluding that support for the
contention that the Court acts strategically in statutory interpretation is “mixed at best”).
81. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
82. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 525 & nn.51–54 (collecting studies showing that Congress
frequently discusses statutory decisions made by the Supreme Court and the circuit courts).
83. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 335–36, 338 tbl.1 (1991) (reporting that from 1975 to 1990, each Congress
overrode an average of twelve Supreme Court decisions and an average of between twenty-three
and twenty-four lower court decisions).
84. See, e.g., Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and
Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE
1990S, at 224, 228 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. Patterson eds., 1998) (finding that Congress
overrode at least 5.6% of the statutory Supreme Court decisions issued in the 1978–1989 terms); see
also JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY
COURT–CONGRESS RELATIONS 197–209 (2004) (listing overrides).
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after an override has been enacted, there is frequently significant judicial
dissensus—defined as either a circuit split or significant intracircuit
disagreement—regarding its application.85 The likelihood of dissensus varies
by subject matter. For example, Barnes’s study found that tax overrides
almost never generated dissensus but that civil rights overrides almost always
did.86 This at least raises a question as to whether courts use the lack of
clarity regarding proper interpretation of overrides as a cover for advancing
their own policy preferences.
In an earlier work, I developed a theoretical concept called “shadow
precedents,” which I defined as reliance by courts on a precedent that had
been overridden by Congress.87 Using examples from employment discrimination law, I showed that courts routinely rely on such overridden
precedents.88 This occurs when a new factual scenario arises that is
substantially similar to the issue posed in the overridden precedent but is not
squarely addressed by the text of the override itself. The interpretive
challenges posed by overrides have not received much scholarly attention.
To the extent that the question has previously been addressed, commentators
(including myself) assumed it posed a binary choice: should courts follow the
shadow precedent or follow the interpretation suggested by the override?89
Gross answered “neither.”
D. Statutory Interpretation Unconstrained: The Hydra Problem
In Greek mythology, the Hydra was a multiheaded monster whose
notable feature was that severance of any head resulted in the growth of a
new head in its place.90 The reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in
Gross suggests that the same can be true for overrides. The enactment of an
override—the metaphorical severing of a “head”—can result in multiple
heads growing in many different statutes. This is what I call the hydra
problem.
The hydra problem is the product of the interrelationship of the
interpretive conventions described above. Following the enactment of a
statute, ambiguous terms are interpreted by courts. Courts, using whatever
interpretive methodology they favor, choose among the “reasonable”
interpretations of the language (a decision that is sometimes influenced by a

85. BARNES, supra note 84, at 84, 90.
86. Id. at 169, 171; see also James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of
Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law,
58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1235 (2009) (finding significant variation between the statutory interpretation
techniques used in tax cases and those used in employment cases).
87. Widiss, supra note 12, at 532–33.
88. Id. at 538–60.
89. See sources cited supra note 12.
90. See, e.g., INGRI PARIN D’AULAIRE & EDGAR PARIN D’AULAIRE, D’AULAIRE’S BOOK OF
GREEK MYTHS 134 (1962).
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stated obligation to defer to reasonable agency interpretations).91 Once a
court with precedential authority issues an authoritative interpretation of
Statute A, that interpretation functionally becomes part of Statute A. Second,
courts following the in pari materia canon apply that authoritative interpretation to a (unspecified and unpredictably growing) group of related statutes
that include the same or similar language as Statute A. Third, Congress,
exercising its authority over the interpretation of statutory language,
overrides the judicial interpretation by amending Statute A, but Congress
does not simultaneously amend all of the other (unspecified and
unpredictably growing) related statutes. With respect to Statute A, the
judicial gloss on the statutory language is superseded by the actual statutory
amendment of the language by Congress. The difficult question is what
governs the interpretation of the related statutes.
If the preexisting language of Statute A and the related statutes could
reasonably bear both the interpretation the court provided and the
interpretation endorsed by Congress in the override, there are three logically
plausible answers to this question, although, as discussed in the parts that
follow, I think there are significant problems with two of them. The first is
that the override supersedes the judicial interpretation of Statute A but not its
exportation to the group of related statutes, leaving the preexisting statutory
precedent controlling the interpretation of related statutes. This is the
approach endorsed by the dissent in Gross.92 The second is that the override
supersedes the judicial interpretation of Statute A and its exportation to the
group of related statutes, and that the preexisting language of the related
statutes should be reinterpreted by courts in line with the meaning endorsed
by Congress in its amendment of Statute A. This is the approach I endorse.93
The third is that the override supersedes the judicial interpretation of
Statute A and its exportation to the group of related statutes but signals only
that the interpretation of language in related statutes should differ from that
adopted by Congress. The third option (which, for good reason, was not
considered viable prior to Gross) dramatically increases contemporary
judicial power, permitting—solely because of the override—courts to adopt a
new judicial interpretation of the language in the related statutes, free from
the constraint of following Congress’s preferred interpretation or the need to
justify a departure from the standard rule of stare decisis.
The basic contours of the hydra problem predated Gross. It can emerge
any time Congress amends a statute to override a judicial interpretation but
does not amend all related statutes to which the disfavored precedent might
plausibly be applied. Employment discrimination law is particularly fertile
ground for the hydra problem because it is a field that contains numerous
statutes with similar language and because it is a field in which overrides are
91. See supra note 31.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 189–94.
93. See infra subpart VI(B).
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quite common. My previous exploration of this issue was published before
Gross was decided, but it briefly discussed confusion over the application of
Price Waterhouse to other statutes, including the ADEA, as an illustration of
shadow precedents.94 Courts have also disagreed about whether amendments
to Title VII overriding the standard for disparate impact liability95 and the
statute of limitations applied to seniority systems96 should affect the
interpretation of related statutes. Similar questions were at play in back-andforths between the courts and Congress regarding extraterritorial application
of discrimination laws97 and the availability of attorneys’ fees and experts’
fees in a variety of statutes.98 But Gross makes the hydra problem far more
serious by holding that neither the prior precedent (which was not explicitly
overruled) nor the override govern the interpretation of the related statutes. It
also addresses the issue more directly than prior decisions and in a context

94. Widiss, supra note 12, at 546–51.
95. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (concluding that Congress’s
override of the pre-1991 judicial interpretation of the disparate impact standard in Title VII did not
preclude its application to the ADEA). The relationship of these statutory provisions is complicated
by an affirmative defense found in the ADEA but not in Title VII. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic
Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2405 (2008) (concluding that the disparate impact standard courts had
developed interpreting Title VII needed to be modified as applied to the ADEA because the ADEA
contains a statutory affirmative defense permitting decisions based on a reasonable factor other than
age). Before Smith was decided, there was a significant circuit split regarding whether disparate
impact claims were cognizable under the ADEA at all, fueled in part by the fact that Congress did
not amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII to override the prior judicial interpretation of that
statute. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701, 703–04 (1st Cir. 1999) (collecting
cases demonstrating the split and discussing the significance of the 1991 amendments).
96. Compare Casteel v. Exec. Bd. of Local 703, 272 F.3d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that
despite Congress’s override of Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989),
Lorance’s reasoning remained persuasive when interpreting the ADEA), and Huels v. Exxon Coal
USA, Inc., 121 F.3d 1047, 1050 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying Lorance in interpreting the ADA),
with Casillas v. Fed. Express Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884–85 (W.D. Tenn. 2001) (finding that
Lorance did not apply “because the ADEA provisions were generally derived from Title VII, [and]
when Congress clarified what it originally meant in § 2000e-2(h), this clarification also applied to
its ADEA counterpart, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)”).
97. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1991) (holding that
Title VII did not apply extraterritorially in part because it lacked language added to override judicial
decisions interpreting the ADEA); see also infra text accompanying notes 226–35 (discussing this
case and Congress’s response in greater detail).
98. For the key steps in the conversation, see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y,
421 U.S. 240, 269–71 (1975) (interpreting the absence of explicit fee-shifting language in an
environmental statute to preclude awards of attorneys’ fees), Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006))
(authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees in several civil rights statutes), Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S.
992, 1012–21 (1984) (holding that the Education of the Handicapped Act, which was not amended
by the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, did not authorize an award of fees and
precluding companion claims under statutes that did permit fees), Handicapped Children’s
Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (explicitly authorizing attorneys’ fees
under the Education of the Handicapped Act), W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102
(1991) (interpreting § 1988 to preclude shifting of experts’ fees as part of attorneys’ fees); and Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (explicitly authorizing
experts’ fees for cases brought pursuant to Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as
incorporated by reference through the amendment of 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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that is of central importance in employment discrimination litigation.99 As
the next parts illustrate, Gross has quickly caused widespread upheaval and
confusion, thus making it a particularly rich case study.
My preliminary research in other areas of statutory law suggests that the
prevalence of the hydra problem in employment discrimination law may be
atypical. Employment discrimination is an area of the law with an unusual
abundance of distinct statutes that are typically interpreted in pari materia. It
is also a politically charged area of the law. The Supreme Court is often
sharply divided in employment discrimination cases, and Congress
frequently overrides the Court’s decisions.100 Courts in turn demonstrate
unusually high levels of disagreement about the meaning of civil rights
overrides as compared to less partisan areas of the law.101 These factors have
significance in two respects. First, it could be that the hydra problem has
emerged as a common problem in employment discrimination law precisely
because it is such a contentious area of the law. Courts may seek to cabin the
significance of an override because they disagree with the approach adopted
by Congress or because they resent the fact that Congress has superseded
their prior interpretation. Second, the partisan nature of the subject matter
also suggests that the aggrandizement of contemporary judicial power
implicit in the approach that the Court endorses in Gross is particular cause
for concern. If overrides are interpreted to free judges from constraints of
precedent and congressional directives, there is a real risk that judges will use
that interpretive freedom to advance their own ideological preferences.
Further study of the interpretation of overrides in other contexts is warranted

99. The actual significance of the difference between the causation standard applied in Title VII
and the standard now applied in ADEA cases can be difficult to measure, but at least one simulated
jury study found it influenced case outcomes. See David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross
Beast of Burden of Proof: Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences
Employment Discrimination Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 903 (2010) (“Findings from our
study suggest that while the outcomes (involving employer liability) are comparable, plaintiffs in
cases with a motivating factor jury instruction were significantly more likely to receive litigation
costs and attorney fees than plaintiffs in cases with the pretext jury instruction.”).
100. As discussed more fully below, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overrode numerous Supreme
Court decisions. See infra notes 201–12 and accompanying text. More recent statutory overrides of
employment discrimination decisions include, for example, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 794a (Supp. III
2010) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, e-5 (Supp. III 2010)) (overriding Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007)), and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705 (Supp. III 2010) and in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.) (overriding Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor
Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)). Many of the Supreme Court decisions that these
acts overrode were 5–4 decisions. E.g., Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 620; see 136 CONG. REC. 1657
(1990) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (criticizing a series of 5–4 decisions from the 1988 term as
“revers[ing] longstanding precedents” and “den[ying] protection to the victims of employment
discrimination,” and describing the then-proposed bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as
“a direct response to those decisions”).
101. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
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to determine how widespread the hydra problem is in other areas of statutory
law and to assess potential responses.
III. Causation in Employment Discrimination Law: The Real Story
The interpretive conundrum posed by overrides emerges over time;
judicial interpretations of statutory language slowly accumulate, Congress
responds, and then courts are called upon to interpret the significance of that
response. This part illustrates the complexity of this interaction by providing
a detailed discussion of the ongoing conversation between the courts and
Congress regarding the standard of causation in employment discrimination
law. It then identifies weaknesses in the Court’s analysis in Gross to
substantiate my claim that the Court’s assertion that Congress “chose” that
the ADEA and Title VII bear different causation standards is unwarranted. It
demonstrates that consideration of the 1991 CRA as a whole, as well as of
legislative history, offers strong support for the opposite conclusion—that is,
that Congress intended and expected that its preferred causation standard
would apply not only to Title VII but also to other similar statutes.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against individuals
“because of” their race, color, sex, national origin, or religion; numerous
other employment statutes likewise prohibit discrimination against
individuals “because of” other protected factors or conduct.102 The first
significant Supreme Court case analyzing this language in the context of
alleged intentional discrimination assumed that the challenged employment
action—in that case, failure to hire—was either “because of” an illegitimate
factor or “because of” legitimate criteria.103 In a series of decisions, the
Court developed a framework of shifting burdens of production designed to
ferret out whether any claimed nondiscriminatory rationale was pretextual,
reasoning that such a finding supports an inference that the “true” (presumed
sole, or at least clearly primary) motivation was discriminatory.104 Courts
applying this framework—typically called “pretext analysis”—soon found

102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); see infra notes 267–81 and accompanying text (discussing
other statutes).
103. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973) (setting forth a
burden-shifting evidentiary framework to determine whether a challenged determination was
because of race or because of an employee’s alleged unlawful conduct).
104. This standard evolved in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252–56 (1981); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–11 (1993); and Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000). In Reeves, the Court assumed,
without deciding, that this burden-shifting structure applied to the ADEA. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at
142 (“This Court has not squarely addressed whether the McDonnell Douglas framework . . . also
applies to ADEA actions. Because the parties do not dispute the issue, we shall assume, arguendo,
that the McDonnell Douglas framework is fully applicable here.”). In Gross, the Court once again
mentioned that it had not yet squarely decided this question. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 2343, 2349 n.2 (“[T]he Court has not definitively decided whether the evidentiary framework of
McDonnell Douglas . . . utilized in Title VII cases is appropriate in the ADEA context.” (citation
omitted)).
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that it was ill suited to assess the legality of employment decisions based on a
mix of permissible and impermissible considerations because a claimed
nondiscriminatory rationale could be part of the true justification for an
action but not the primary or sole justification.105 Courts therefore needed to
determine whether in such “mixed-motive” cases a plaintiff bears the burden
of showing that sex, race, or another proscribed factor simply played a role in
the decision? A motivating role? A decisive role? In common speech,
“because of” can bear all of these meanings. The issue in Gross, like the
issue in Price Waterhouse and the issue that Congress addressed in its partial
override and partial codification of Price Waterhouse, was what meaning the
words held in antidiscrimination statutes.
A. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
Ann Hopkins worked as a senior manager at the accounting firm Price
Waterhouse.106 After she had worked for the company for five years, the
partners in her office proposed her as a candidate for partner.107 Her
candidacy was denied.108
Evidence from the partners’ deliberations
suggested that this decision was based on a combination of concerns that she
had weak interpersonal skills (a legitimate criterion) and concerns that she
was insufficiently “ladylike” (an illegitimate criterion).109 The Supreme
Court splintered badly over whether this violated Title VII’s prohibition on
discrimination “because of . . . sex.”110 There were four opinions, none of
which garnered a majority—a fact that becomes important in the subsequent
story.111
A plurality opinion authored by Justice Brennan, on behalf of himself
and Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, began from the premise that
Title VII seeks to balance “employee rights” to be judged without regard to
sex or other prohibited criteria, with “employer prerogatives” to rely on any

105. See, e.g., Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 916 (3d Cir. 1983) (interpreting
Title VII to require a showing that race was the determining factor or but-for cause of the adverse
action rather than merely a substantial or motivating factor in that action); id. at 921–22 (Adams, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the but-for standard would not adequately protect plaintiffs when race is
one factor, but not the only factor, in an employment decision); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979) (considering a mixed-motive situation and holding that the jury should
have been instructed that age must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence to be the
determining or the but-for factor in the plaintiff’s discharge).
106. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989) (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 233.
108. See id. at 231–32 (stating that Hopkins’s bid for partnership was held over for a year, at
which point the partners in her office refused to repropose her for partnership).
109. Id. at 234–36.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
111. For a fascinating exposé of the discussions among the Justices regarding the appropriate
causation standard and their struggle to find an approach that could garner five votes, see Struve,
supra note 9, at 299–304.
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qualities or characteristics not specifically prohibited.112 The plurality
opinion flatly states that “[t]o construe the words ‘because of’ as colloquial
shorthand for ‘but-for causation,’ . . . is to misunderstand them.”113 Relying
on textual arguments, legislative history, its understanding of Title VII’s
underlying policies, and prior precedent interpreting Title VII, labor statutes,
and constitutional provisions, the plurality announced that a plaintiff would
instead bear the burden of showing that an illegitimate factor played a
“motivating part” in the challenged decision.114 If a plaintiff proved this, the
burden would then shift to the defendant to prove that it would have made
the “same decision” even if the illegitimate factor had not played a role.115 A
defendant who made this showing defeated liability entirely.116
Justice White concurred.117 He agreed with the plurality that liability
could be established if a plaintiff proved that sex or another illegitimate
criterion was a motivating factor in an employment decision, relying almost
exclusively on a prior First Amendment public-employee-retaliation case that
had required a showing that protected speech was a “substantial . . . or . . .
motivating factor” in an employment decision.118 Justice White also agreed
with the plurality that an affirmative defense should be available to
defendants who could prove that they would have taken the same action, but
he took issue with the plurality’s assertion that an employer generally would
need to provide “objective evidence” to support this defense.119
Justice O’Connor also concurred.120 She stated that the standard should
be whether sex or another prohibited criteria “[was] the ‘but-for’ cause of an
adverse employment action,” but like the plurality and Justice White, she
endorsed a burden-shifting scheme that placed the ultimate burden of
showing the absence of but-for causation on the defendant.121 In Justice
O’Connor’s formulation, a plaintiff would need to show by “direct evidence”
that sex, race, or another prohibited criteria “was a substantial factor in the
decision”;122 this showing would justify the “strong medicine” of shifting the
burden to the defendant to demonstrate it would have taken the same
action.123 Justice O’Connor drew an analogy to multiple-causation tort cases,
where courts have recognized that “leaving the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiff to prove ‘but-for’ causation would be both unfair and destructive of

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id. at 258 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 260–61.
Id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 261–62.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 262.
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the deterrent purposes embodied in the concept of duty of care.”124 She
opined that, similarly in this context, a showing that sex or another
illegitimate factor was a “substantial” factor in an employment action was
sufficient to “trigger[]” “the deterrent purpose of the statute” and place a
burden on the employer to prove that reliance on the factor did not actually
“cause[]” the challenged employment practice.125
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia,
dissented.126 The dissent argued that “because of” naturally means “but-for”
causation.127 It also argued that the burden shifting endorsed by the plurality
and concurring opinions would engender widespread confusion, particularly
because the Court had already interpreted employment discrimination
statutes to require shifting the burden of production (rather than that of
persuasion) in cases alleging a single discriminatory motive, in order to
determine whether any legitimate rationales offered by a defendant were
pretextual.128
Because none of the opinions garnered five votes, lower courts have
struggled to determine which opinion states the holding of the case. Most
have applied Justice O’Connor’s concurrence on the ground that it presents
the narrowest holding supporting the outcome.129 As discussed below, in
Gross, the petitioner argued that Justice White’s concurrence should be
considered the controlling opinion, a position subsequently endorsed by the
Gross dissenters.130
B. 1991 Civil Rights Act and Desert Palace v. Costa
In 1991, Congress enacted the 1991 CRA, a major civil rights law that
addressed Price Waterhouse and several other then-recent and wildly
unpopular employment discrimination decisions by the Supreme Court.131
Congress responded to Price Waterhouse in two ways. First, as described
above, the primary operative language of Title VII, § 703(a), prohibits

124. Id. at 263.
125. Id. at 265.
126. Id. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 281.
128. Id. at 290–91.
129. See, e.g., Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying
the “direct evidence” and “substantial factor” standards from what it called Justice O’Connor’s
“controlling concurrence”); see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotations omitted)).
130. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
Brief for Petitioner at 52–55, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 208116 (arguing that
because Justice White agreed with the plurality in endorsing a motivating-factor standard without a
direct-evidence requirement, that standard should control).
131. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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discrimination “because of” an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.132 The 1991 CRA added to § 703 a new subsection,
subsection (m), which states that “an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”133 This new
provision codified the motivating-factor language endorsed as an interpretation of Title VII by the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion and Justice
White’s concurring opinion. Second, the 1991 CRA added a section to the
remedial provisions that specifies that “[o]n a claim in which an individual
proves a violation under § 703(m) and a respondent [employer] demonstrates
that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor,” the court may grant declaratory relief,
certain injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs “directly attributable
only to the pursuit of [that] claim,” but not damages or an order requiring
reinstatement, hiring, or promotion.134 This provision overrides the plurality
and concurrences in Price Waterhouse, replacing the absolute defense on
liability with a limitation on remedies.
The House Education and Labor Committee Report accompanying the
bill characterizes these changes as necessary because Price Waterhouse
“sen[t] a message that a little overt sexism or racism is okay, as long as it was
not the only basis for the employer’s action.”135 The report continues: “If
Title VII’s ban on discrimination in employment is to be meaningful, victims
of proven discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of
discrimination must be held liable for their actions. Price Waterhouse
jeopardizes that fundamental principle.”136 The House Judiciary Committee
Report includes similar language.137 In other words, at least as understood by
the authors of the committee reports, the 1991 CRA was necessary to
override aspects of Price Waterhouse because the Court’s interpretation
undermined Congress’s antidiscrimination objectives.
The House Judiciary Committee Report also indicates some awareness
of the related-statute problem and signals that committee members, at least,
thought that amending Title VII would be sufficient to end reliance on Price
Waterhouse and other overridden precedents. The report specifies:

132. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 214, 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)).
133. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
134. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
135. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585.
136. Id.
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 710
(“Price Waterhouse . . . threaten[ed] to undermine Title VII’s twin objectives of deterring
employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries suffered by victims of
discrimination.”).
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A number of other laws banning discrimination, including the
[ADA] and the [ADEA] are modeled after, and have been interpreted
in a manner consistent with, Title VII. The Committee intends that
these other laws . . . be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent
with Title VII as amended by this Act. For example, . . . mixed
motive cases involving disability under the ADA should be interpreted
consistent with [the motivating factor and limitations on damages
provisions].138
The 1991 CRA, however, did not amend these other statutes to include the
motivating-factor language. As discussed more fully below, it did make an
unrelated minor change to the ADEA and a different unrelated minor change
to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).139
Shortly after the 1991 CRA was enacted, courts began to struggle with
three related questions regarding causation standards, all of which stem from
the interpretative challenges posed by overrides. First, in substantive
Title VII cases, did a plaintiff need to provide direct evidence of
discrimination to obtain the benefit of the motivating-factor standard now set
forth in § 703(m)? There was nothing in the text of the statute that referenced direct evidence. This potential requirement came from Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse. In other words, this question
really boiled down to whether, at least as applied to Title VII substantive
claims, the 1991 CRA entirely superseded Price Waterhouse’s causation
standard. The circuits split on the issue, as well as on what constituted direct
evidence if it was required.140 The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the
matter in Desert Palace v. Costa.141 In a unanimous decision, the Court
began by noting that the new provisions in the 1991 CRA were a “respon[se]
to Price Waterhouse.”142 The Court then treated the question as a
straightforward matter of statutory interpretation, holding that § 703(m)
requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate” that an illegitimate factor was a
“motivating” factor and that a separate provision of the 1991 CRA defined
“demonstrates” as “mee[ts] the burdens of production and persuasion.”143
Reasoning that Congress knows how to specify heightened proof standards
when it wants to and that it had failed to in this instance, the Court concluded
that direct evidence was not required.144

138. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696–97.
139. See infra subpart III(D).
140. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95 (2003) (collecting cases demonstrating
the circuit split on whether direct evidence was required); Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc.,
199 F.3d 572, 582–83 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing different approaches taken in the circuit split on
what counted as direct evidence).
141. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
142. Id. at 94.
143. Id. at 98–99, 101 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(2000)).
144. Id. at 99.
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The second question regarding causation that lower courts faced was
what relevance, if any, the 1991 CRA’s amendment of Title VII’s substantive
provisions had for cases arising under other employment discrimination
statutes—such as the ADEA and the ADA—and under the retaliation
provisions of Title VII, which are located in a separate subsection from the
antidiscrimination provisions.145
This question likewise engendered
widespread disagreement. The majority of courts reasoned that Congress’s
“failure” to amend these other statutes and Title VII’s retaliation subsection
should be understood as an indication by Congress that it expected Price
Waterhouse to continue to control the interpretation of these statutes.146 In
other words, they applied Price Waterhouse as a shadow precedent. A
minority of courts, by contrast, held that the approach endorsed by the 1991
CRA could be applied to other statutory provisions.147 This was most
common with respect to the antiretaliation provisions in Title VII (because
they are part of the same statute) and the ADA, which explicitly adopts the
remedial structure of Title VII and thus the remedial limitation set forth in
§ 706(g), as amended by the 1991 CRA.
The third question regarding causation that lower courts faced after the
1991 CRA, and particularly after Desert Palace was decided, was, with
respect to mixed-motive cases brought under employment discrimination
statutes other than Title VII in circuits that held that Price Waterhouse
provided the controlling precedent, did a plaintiff need to have direct
evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive instruction that could
shift the burden to the defendant to prove it would have taken the same
action?148 This third question actually required answering two subsidiary
questions. One is common to all Supreme Court decisions that fail to yield a
majority decision: Which opinion provided the holding for Price
Waterhouse? If Justice White’s opinion, rather than Justice O’Connor’s
opinion, was deemed controlling, there would be no direct-evidence
requirement. But since the general consensus was that Justice O’Connor’s
opinion controlled,149 the second—crucial—question was particular to the

145. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing the
quandary regarding the ADEA), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009); Parker v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing the quandary regarding ADA claims);
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 934 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing the quandary regarding
Title VII retaliation claims).
146. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 549–51 (collecting cases applying Price Waterhouse to other
statutes).
147. See id. at 550 & n.176 (collecting cases applying the motivating-factor standard in the
1991 CRA to other statutes).
148. This was the question addressed in the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Gross, which was
vacated by the Supreme Court. See Gross, 526 F.3d at 361–62 (holding that the rationale of Justice
O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse opinion requiring direct evidence of discrimination was not
undermined by Desert Place and thus that direct evidence should be required in ADEA claims).
149. See, e.g., id. at 362 (“[O]ur court adopted Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion as the
controlling rule.”); Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that
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interpretive challenges implicit in overrides and the complex interaction
between Title VII and other statutes: Did the Court’s analysis in Desert
Palace (which interpreted the new language added to Title VII to override
Price Waterhouse and other decisions) hold any relevance to the application
of the rule announced in Price Waterhouse as applied to other statutes? This
was the question on which the Court granted certiorari in Gross.150 The
question the Court answered, however, was quite different.
C. Gross v. FBL Financial Services
Jack Gross began working for FBL Financial Group, Inc. (FBL) in
1971.151 Thirty years later, he held the position of “claims administrator
director.”152 In 2003, when Gross was fifty-four years old, FBL restructured
positions; it gave many of Gross’s responsibilities to a younger employee in
a newly created position and changed Gross’s title to “claims project
coordinator.”153 Gross claimed that this was a demotion, and he presented
what the trial court characterized as “ample” circumstantial evidence that it
was motivated by his age.154 He did not, however, have any direct evidence
that age played a role in the decision.155
Gross filed a claim under the ADEA and the Iowa Civil Rights Act.156
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence, the district court’s charge to
the jury specified that if they found that “age was a motivating factor” in the
decision to demote Gross, they must issue a verdict for him unless FBL
proved that it “would have demoted [Gross] regardless of his age.”157 The
district court thus answered the second question in the previous subpart by
concluding that, in most respects, Price Waterhouse governed causation
under the ADEA but answered the third question above by determining that,
after Desert Palace, a mixed-motive instruction could issue even in the
absence of direct evidence. The jury entered a verdict for Gross and awarded
him $46,945.158 The Eighth Circuit reversed.159 It held that Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse controlled the interpretation of
the ADEA and that Desert Palace was irrelevant because it relied primarily
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was controlling). But see supra note 130 and accompanying text
(discussing the argument that Justice White’s concurrence should be deemed controlling).
150. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009)
(No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4462099.
151. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Gross v. FBL Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 4:04-CV-60209-TJS, 2006 WL 6151670, at *5 (S.D.
Iowa June 23, 2006), rev’d, 526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
155. Id.
156. Id. at *1.
157. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009) (alteration in original).
158. Gross, 2006 WL 6151670, at *1.
159. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343
(2009).
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on textual language added to Title VII by the 1991 CRA and “did not speak
directly to the vitality” of Price Waterhouse.160
The petition for certiorari asked, “Must a plaintiff present direct
evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a
non-Title VII discrimination case?”161 The opposition to the petition (filed
by FBL’s counsel in Iowa, who had litigated the case below) argued that
there was not a significant circuit split regarding application of Price
Waterhouse to mixed-motive cases under statutes other than Title VII and
that the uncertainty created by Desert Palace regarding the necessity of
direct evidence had “faded.”162 In other words, it was expected that the case
would resolve the second and third questions set forth above. But after
certiorari was granted, FBL retained an experienced Supreme Court litigator
as its lead counsel;163 a significant portion of its opposition brief on the
merits was devoted to an argument that the Supreme Court should overrule
Price Waterhouse, at least as applied to the ADEA.164 The Court, in a 5–4
decision, ultimately did so.165
Purely as a matter of procedure, this was shocking. Generally, the
Court will only answer questions raised in the petition or opposition to the
petition for certiorari.166 This ensures that all parties and amici know what
issues are under consideration and can develop their arguments

160. Id. at 359, 362.
161. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 150, at i.
162. Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5 & n.5, 9, 17–18, Gross, 129 S.
Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2008 WL 4824079.
163. Compare id. at 25 (listing Frank Harty as counsel of record), with Brief for Respondent at
56, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 507026 (listing Carter G. Phillips as the counsel
of record). Carter G. Phillips was counsel of record for FBL on the merits brief. Brief for
Respondent, supra, at 56. Phillips is the Managing Partner of the Washington, D.C. office of Sidley
Austin LLP; he is a former Supreme Court clerk and a former Assistant to the Solicitor General, and
his professional biography asserts that he has argued more Supreme Court cases than any other
lawyer currently in private practice. Our People—Carter G. Phillips, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP,
http://www.sidley.com/carter-phillips/.
164. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 163, at 26–40 (dedicating roughly one half of the
argument portion of the brief to arguing that the Court should overrule Price Waterhouse as applied
to the ADEA).
165. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346, 2351–52 (2009).
166. See id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“We would normally expect notice of an intent to
make so far-reaching an argument in the respondent’s opposition to a petition for certiorari, cf. this
Court’s Rule 15.2, thereby assuring adequate preparation time for those likely affected and wishing
to participate.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The majority justified its actions on the grounds
that “[t]he statement of any question presented is deemed to comprise every subsidiary question
fairly included therein.” Id. at 2348 n.1 (majority opinion) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For commentary about this move by the majority, see Hart, supra note 9,
at 269 (calling the Court’s action “remarkable” and “contrary to regular Court procedure for good
reason”); Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court Is No Longer a
Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 29), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1781243 (“In Gross yet again, in order to make new law, the Court decided
a question not put before it by the parties.”).

890

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 90:859

accordingly.167 The dissenters in Gross characterized it as particularly
“irresponsible” to preclude the United States, which participated in the case
as amicus curiae, from addressing in its brief questions regarding whether
Price Waterhouse should be overruled.168 Tellingly, when asked a question
during oral argument about the advisability of “ditch[ing]” Price
Waterhouse, the Assistant to the Solicitor General arguing on behalf of the
government opposed the idea and said it would create “massive confusion,
not only under the Age Act, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
the Family Medical Leave Act, a variety of labor statutes, [and] disciplinary
statutes.”169
The Court’s decision was equally surprising substantively. The legal
analysis in the majority opinion begins with a proclamation that “[b]ecause
Title VII is materially different [from the ADEA] with respect to the relevant
burden of persuasion,” the Court’s prior decisions regarding Title VII “do not
control our construction of the ADEA.”170 It then proceeds to recount the
story set forth in the previous two subparts, but in a way that rhetorically
erases the intricate web of connections between Title VII, the ADEA, Price
Waterhouse, the 1991 CRA, and Desert Palace which had led to the question
presented to the Court. The majority opinion relegates to a footnote the
starting premise, well-established in prior Supreme Court precedent, that the
substantive provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are generally interpreted
identically because the ADEA was derived in haec verba from Title VII.171
The Gross majority does, however, summarize the various holdings of Price
Waterhouse before stating that “Congress has since amended Title VII.”172
This is factually correct—but it fails to acknowledge that the amendment was
a direct response to Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of “because of” in
Title VII (a fact the unanimous Court had admitted forthrightly in Desert

167. This may have been quite significant in Gross. In his opening brief, Gross argued at
length that the direct-evidence requirement should be abandoned because it had been very
confusing; the brief even quoted Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse on this point. See
Brief for Petitioner at 30–42, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL 208116 (explaining
the problems that followed from the direct-evidence requirement). Viewed against a backdrop that
presumed Price Waterhouse applied, with an open question of whether direct evidence was
required, this was probably good strategy. But if it had been apparent that the Court might abandon
Price Waterhouse entirely, Gross’s counsel might well have eschewed focusing on how “confusing”
the current regime was. The amici likewise simply assumed that Price Waterhouse would apply.
See Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343
(No. 08-441), 2009 WL 253859 (arguing that “Price Waterhouse does not require that [the] Court
impose a direct evidence requirement under the ADEA”).
168. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–28, Gross, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (No. 08-441), 2009 WL
832958.
170. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2348.
171. See id. at 2349 n.2 (answering the dissent’s argument that the Court “must incorporate its
past interpretations of Title VII into the ADEA” in this case by pointing out that “the Court’s
approach to interpreting the ADEA in light of Title VII has not been uniform”).
172. Id. at 2349.
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Palace)173 and accordingly might have bearing on the interpretation of the
“because of” language in the ADEA.
The Court then states that it “cannot ignore Congress’[s] decision to
amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the
ADEA,” particularly because the 1991 CRA included a different amendment
to the ADEA.174 Having thus putatively severed the connection between
Title VII and the ADEA, the Gross Court proceeds to interpret the “because
of” language in the ADEA as if it were working on a blank slate. Its analysis
begins with dictionary definitions of “because of” as meaning “by reason of”
or “on account of.”175 These dictionary definitions might arguably describe a
motivating-factor standard as readily as a but-for causation standard. But the
Court does not just reject the causation standard enacted by Congress for
Title VII. It also ignores a large body of precedent—both predating and
postdating Price Waterhouse—interpreting several other employment and
labor statutes and constitutional provisions to likewise impose a motivatingfactor causation standard.176 Instead, the Gross Court supports its conclusion
that “because of” in the ADEA means but-for causation by citing a pair of
recent decisions interpreting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)177 and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)178 to
require but-for causation.179 The language interpreted in these statutes was

173. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 (2003) (stating that § 107 of the 1991
Civil Rights Act “‘respond[ed]’ to Price Waterhouse” (alteration in original)).
174. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
175. Id. at 2350 (citing and quoting largely identical definitions found in 1 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 746 (1933), THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132
(1966), and 1 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 194 (1966)).
176. As noted above, Price Waterhouse relied in part on earlier Supreme Court decisions
interpreting both constitutional and statutory provisions. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 249–50 (1989) (plurality opinion). Following Price Waterhouse, lower courts applied the
Court’s “motivating factor” causation standard to numerous other employment statutes. Widiss,
supra note 12, at 549–51. The Gross Court does support its assertion that the ADEA requires a
showing of but-for causation by quoting a passage in a prior ADEA decision stating that a claim
“‘cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in [the employer’s
decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.’” Gross, 129 S. Ct. at
2350 (alteration in original) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). This
statement is inapposite because Hazen Paper was litigated as a pretext case where the sole issue
before the Court was whether reliance on an employee’s pension status—which correlated with
age—constituted a violation of the statute. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 608–09. Moreover, to the
extent it is deemed to have any relevance in the mixed-motive context, the quoted statement, which
does not identify which party bears the burden for this showing, could just as readily be describing
the standard announced in Price Waterhouse as the standard that the Court adopts in Gross.
Additionally, as the Gross dissent points out, there are other passages in Hazen Paper that seem to
endorse the motivating-factor test. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).
178. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a–1681x (2006).
179. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (citing Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131
(2008) and Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007)). The Court also includes a “cf.”
citation to a general torts treatise. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
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not even “because of”; the RICO case interpreted “by reason of,”180 and the
FCRA case interpreted “based on.”181 Having ostensibly justified a but-for
standard, the Court relies on prior ADEA pretext cases that hold that the
plaintiff retains the burden of proof to make this showing.182 The sleight of
hand is thus complete. Without explicitly overruling Price Waterhouse, the
majority in Gross adopts the precise but-for standard that the dissenters in
Price Waterhouse had unsuccessfully advocated and that Congress had
clearly repudiated.
After this analysis, the Court returns to petitioners’ claim that Price
Waterhouse should control. Rather than addressing the claim head on, the
Court merely states that “it is far from clear that the Court would have the
same approach [as stated in Price Waterhouse] were it to consider the question today in the first instance.”183 This might well be correct, but it should
be entirely irrelevant. The whole point of a rule of precedent is that it generally binds future courts, even if they might resolve a given question
differently than the prior court had. The Court ultimately makes a gesture to
the standards typically employed by courts to justify overruling prior statutory precedent—which include whether a standard has proven
“unworkable”184—by stating that “courts have found it particularly difficult
to craft an instruction to explain [Price Waterhouse’s] burden-shifting
framework.”185 As Catherine Struve documents, the support cited for this
proposition entirely failed to prove the Court’s contention.186 Additionally,
because Title VII’s causation standard now differs from that of the ADEA,
and because the Court failed to explicitly overrule (whatever is left of) Price
Waterhouse, its decision actually engenders widespread new confusion.187
Justice Stevens authored a dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Souter.188
Stevens’s dissent argued that Price Waterhouse’s
interpretation of “because of” in Title VII should control the interpretation of
the analogous language in the ADEA.189 The dissent characterized the
180. See Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 2141 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)’s provision providing
remedies for “any person injured . . . by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter”).
181. See Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2205 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)’s provision prohibiting
“adverse action[s] . . . based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer [credit]
report” (second alteration in original)).
182. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2351 (citing Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 128 S. Ct. 2361, 2363–66
(2008) and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 143 (2000)).
183. Id. at 2351–52.
184. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (explaining that a
“traditional justification for overruling a prior case” is when “inherent confusion [has been] created
by an unworkable decision”).
185. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
186. See Struve, supra note 9, at 293–97 (arguing that the authorities cited in support of the
proposition that the burden-shifting instruction would be unduly confusing to juries do not actually
substantiate that assertion).
187. See infra subparts V(A)–(B).
188. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2353–57.
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majority’s decision to eschew the standard in Title VII as amended by the
1991 CRA as “reasonabl[e],” although it referenced, in a footnote, the legislative history suggesting that Congress may have expected that its approach
would govern these other statutes.190 Nonetheless, it deemed Congress’s
actions an important part of the analysis, arguing that Congress “substantially
endorsed” Price Waterhouse’s motivating-factor analysis, “provid[ing] all
the more reason to adhere to that decision’s motivating-factor test” rather
than the but-for standard “repudiated” by Price Waterhouse twenty years
before.191 And it pointed out, in response to the majority’s stated concerns
about workability, that the approach in Gross will complicate “every case in
which a plaintiff raises both ADEA and Title VII claims.”192 The dissent
then went on to answer the question on which certiorari was granted. Justice
Stevens contended that in Price Waterhouse, Justice White’s opinion, rather
than Justice O’Connor’s opinion, was controlling and thus that Price
Waterhouse did not actually require direct evidence.193 He further contended
that any uncertainty regarding this point should be resolved by Desert
Palace’s holding that heightened evidentiary standards should not be inferred
without a clear statutory basis.194
Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Souter, which argued on policy grounds that since the “employee likely
knows less than . . . the employer about what the employer was thinking”
when making an employment decision, the burden to show that the employer
would have made the same decision absent consideration of an impermissible
factor should rest with the defendant.195
D. An Almost Irrelevant Fact: The 1991 Civil Rights Act’s Separate
Amendment of the ADEA
The Gross Court placed great emphasis on the fact that Congress
responded to Price Waterhouse by adding the motivating-factor language to
Title VII but did not add that language to the ADEA, particularly since
Congress simultaneously made a different amendment to the ADEA.196 The

190. Id. at 2356 & n.6.
191. Id. at 2356.
192. Id. at 2356–57.
193. See id. at 2357 (arguing that Justice White’s concurrence is controlling because Justice
White agreed with the plurality on the motivating-factor test and the lack of need for direct
evidence, and thus provided a fifth vote for the rationale explaining the result of Price Waterhouse);
see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
194. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357–58.
195. Id. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2349, 2350 & n.3 (majority opinion) (“We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to
amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.”).
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Gross dissent likewise deemed this quite significant.197 So have other
commentators.198 Simply put, I think this a serious mistake.
First, the Gross Court mischaracterized the facts. The Gross Court
stated that Congress “contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several
ways.”199 This is incorrect. The 1991 CRA explicitly amended the ADEA in
just one respect: it added language to require the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to notify plaintiffs in ADEA cases—as it
notified plaintiffs in Title VII cases—regarding the disposition of administrative complaints.200 Second, and more importantly, consideration of the
1991 CRA as a whole provides strong support for the opposite inference—
that is, that Congress intended and expected that the ADEA would be
interpreted in line with the amendments to Title VII.
To see this, it is first necessary to describe in somewhat greater detail
the 1991 CRA. As is true of much legislation, the 1991 CRA does many
things. One of its primary purposes was to respond to numerous Supreme
Court decisions interpreting employment discrimination statutes.201 As
discussed above, in response to Price Waterhouse, the 1991 CRA amended
Title VII but did not add comparable motivating-factor language to the
ADEA, the ADA, or other statutes.202 In response to Supreme Court
decisions concerning the standard of proof in disparate impact cases,203 the
applicability of consent decrees,204 and the statute of limitations in cases
challenging seniority provisions205—all decisions arising under Title VII—
the 1991 CRA similarly amended Title VII but not the ADEA, the ADA, or
other statutes (although one of the provisions added to Title VII incorporates
by reference claims arising under other employment discrimination
197. See id. at 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the 1991 Act amended only Title VII
and not the ADEA with respect to mixed-motives claims, the Court reasonably declines to apply the
amended provisions to the ADEA.”).
198. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 8, at 100–01 (“Section 107, however, amended only Title VII,
not the ADEA or any other federal law.”).
199. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). The Court supports this
statement by citing to § 115 of the Act—which contains the revisions regarding EEOC
notification—and § 302 of the Act, which is not an amendment to the ADEA but rather a reference
within newly created antidiscrimination protections for certain government employees to the
definition of age contained within the ADEA. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2006)); Civil Rights Act of
1991 § 302 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1202 (2006)).
200. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 115 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2006)).
201. Id. § 3.
202. Id. § 107(a).
203. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (holding that a
defendant could defeat a claim of disparate impact by showing merely that the “challenged practice
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer”).
204. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762–68 (1989) (holding that third parties affected by a
consent decree could challenge the agreement even when they had known about the litigation and
failed to intervene in the prior action).
205. See Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989) (holding that the statute of
limitations on challenging a seniority system ran from the time of the system’s adoption).
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statutes).206 In response to a decision regarding the possibility of bringing
harassment claims under § 1981,207 the 1991 CRA amended only § 1981.208
In response to a decision considering the availability of expert fees under
§ 1988,209 the 1991 CRA amended only § 1988.210 In all of these overrides,
Congress amended only the statute actually interpreted in the prior judicial
interpretation. There was one departure from this pattern. In response to a
decision interpreting Title VII to preclude extraterritorial jurisdiction,211
Congress added language to Title VII and the ADA that it had previously
added to the ADEA—but, as discussed below, this is likely explained by the
fact that in this instance Congress was responding to a hydra problem that
had already developed.212

206. Civil Rights Act of 1991 §§ 104–105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006),
and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)) (establishing a disparate impact standard that requires a
defendant to prove that a challenged practice is “job related” and a “business necessity”); id. § 108
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2006)) (precluding third parties from challenging
consent decrees if they had actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to object to the proposed
order or if their interests were adequately represented in prior challenges); id. § 112 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2006)) (providing that the statute of limitations for challenging
an intentionally discriminatory seniority system runs from when it is adopted, when an individual
becomes subject to it, or when a person is injured by its application). The override of Martin v.
Wilks, concerning consent decrees, differs from the other overrides in that the amendment codified
within Title VII specifies that it applies to all claims “of employment discrimination under the
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws.” Id. § 108 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)
(2006)). In other words, this adopts a “blanket amendment” approach similar to that which
Congress considered in the bills proposed to override Gross—and with it concerns regarding notice
and overbreadth. See infra text accompanying notes 370–77. The difference between the structure
of the Martin override and the other overrides interpreting substantive language in Title VII may
well be explained by the fact that Martin v. Wilks, although arising under Title VII, did not interpret
specific language in Title VII; rather it relied on general principles of procedural law. Martin, 490
U.S. at 762–69; see also infra note 223 (discussing commentary on the significance of this
difference and its implications for assessing the significance of the other overrides on interpretation
of the ADEA).
207. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (holding that racial
harassment claims were not actionable under § 1981 because that section does not apply to conduct
occurring after the formation of a contract).
208. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006))
(expanding the prohibition on discrimination in § 1981 to include discrimination occurring in the
terms and conditions of employment).
209. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991) (interpreting § 1988 to
preclude shifting of experts’ fees as part the allowed shifting of attorneys’ fees).
210. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 113 (authorizing the court to award expert fees in its
discretion for cases brought to enforce § 1981a, which addresses claims pursuant to various civil
rights statutes, including Title VII and the ADA). This is probably appropriately characterized as a
“partial” override, in that the amendments only explicitly made experts’ fees available in certain
employment discrimination contexts, and the prior decisions had concerned the availability of these
fees in other, additional contexts. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. This may be because
the 1991 CRA focused on employment, or it may be that Congress purposefully chose to simply
carve out a limited exception from the interpretation previously announced by the Court.
211. See Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) (holding that Title VII did not apply
extraterritorially).
212. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 109 (adding language expanding the definition of employee
to include a United States citizen in a foreign country and inserting a new subsection relating to
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The 1991 CRA also included substantive amendments and expansions
of various employment discrimination laws that were not directly responsive
to Supreme Court interpretations. Most of these reduced disparities among
the various federal employment discrimination statutes, although they did not
make them identical. For example, Congress permitted plaintiffs in Title VII
and ADA suits to recover compensatory and punitive damages, up to statutory caps,213 making the remedial structure of these statutes more comparable
to that of § 1981 (which permitted uncapped damages)214 and the ADEA
(which permitted double damages for willful violations).215 Congress also
explicitly permitted jury trials in Title VII cases (and, by reference, in ADA
cases),216 again making Title VII and the ADA more similar to the ADEA
and § 1981, which had already been interpreted to permit jury trials.217 And,
as noted above, Congress amended the ADEA to make the EEOC’s notice
requirements more similar to those it followed when enforcing Title VII.218
The 1991 CRA also created a Glass Ceiling Commission to study barriers to
advancement faced by women and minorities,219 enacted a separate statute
that prohibits discrimination against certain government employees,220 and

covered entities in foreign countries). For a discussion of the hydra problem at issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 226–37. Congress may also have thought it important to add specific language
to both statutes regarding potential conflicts with foreign jurisdictions’ laws, although this arguably
could have also been addressed through interpretation of the preexisting language. See Aramco, 499
U.S. at 275 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the text of Title VII prior to the 1991 CRA
provided support for applying the law extraterritorially to U.S. employers employing U.S. citizens
abroad while avoiding conflicts with foreign law).
213. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)).
214. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1975) (holding that
compensatory and punitive damages are available under § 1981 and that backpay awards under
§ 1981 are not restricted to the two years specified for backpay recovery under Title VII).
215. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) (incorporating § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b), which, in cases involving willful violations, provides for the payment of an equal
amount of liquidated damages in addition to unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime).
216. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006))
(permitting jury trials under Title VII and the ADA).
217. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585 (1978) (holding that the ADEA permits jury
trials); Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1983) (describing a case in which
the plaintiff had a jury trial on race discrimination claims brought pursuant to § 1981 and § 1983
and a bench trial for race discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII).
218. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 115 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)
(2006)) (“If a charge filed with the Commission under [the ADEA] is dismissed or the proceedings
of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission, the Commission shall notify the
person aggrieved. A civil action may be brought . . . against the respondent named in the charge
within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such notice.”), with Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 105–06 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006)) (“If a charge filed with the Commission [under Title VII] . . . is dismissed
by the Commission, . . . the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety
days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in
the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”).
219. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 203.
220. Id. § 302.
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authorized the EEOC to establish a Technical Assistance Training Institute
and to carry out educational and outreach activities.221
The Court in Gross asserts that it is important to consider the 1991 CRA
as a whole when determining what inference to draw from Congress’s
“neglect[ing]” to amend the ADEA when it added the motivating-factor
language to Title VII.222 As a general principle, I agree that this could have
relevance. As noted above, the 1991 CRA responded to several different
decisions interpreting Title VII by enacting overrides. If, with respect to
some of these overrides, Congress had amended both Title VII and the
ADEA, and if, with respect to the override of Price Waterhouse, it had
amended just Title VII, there would be far stronger support for the inference
that Congress affirmatively chose to have the ADEA interpreted differently
from Title VII with respect to mixed-motive claims. But that was not the
case. Rather, the only change that the 1991 CRA made to the ADEA was the
small technical revision concerning EEOC procedures. Looked at in context,
I assert that this is almost entirely irrelevant to resolving the question posed
by Gross. Moreover, even if Congress had amended both the ADEA and
Title VII with respect to some of the other overrides, it would still be
essential to carefully consider context before concluding that Congress’s
“neglect[ing]” to add motivating-factor language to the ADEA was a
purposeful and meaningful choice to impose different causation standards
under the two statutes.223
The Court in Gross cites a single case, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co.224 (Aramco), in support of its pivotal assertion that “[w]hen Congress

221. Id. § 110 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(j) (2006)); id. § 111 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(h) (2006)).
222. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349–50 (2009) (asserting that
Congress’s “contemporaneous[] amend[ment] of the ADEA” was an important factor in its
analysis).
223. Id. at 2349. It is important to note that Congress’s override of Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755 (1989), specified that the new language added to Title VII applied to any consent decree
“resolv[ing] a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil rights
laws,” thus implicitly reaching claims that arise under the ADEA although not specifically
identifying the ADEA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (2006). For an argument that this distinction is
significant and supports a conclusion that the overrides of interpretations of Title VII’s substantive
language, including the modification of the causation standard in Price Waterhouse, should not be
applied to the ADEA, see Eglit, supra note 12, at 1118–20, 1172–202. For an argument that the
issue addressed in Martin and its override differed significantly from the other overrides because
Martin involved a “principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence” rather than
“the direct interpretation of statutory language” in Title VII, and that it accordingly has little
relevance for assessing the appropriateness of applying the other overrides to the ADEA, see
Prenkert, supra note 12, at 248 n.212. I find Professor Prenkert’s analysis persuasive on this point.
For reasons explained more fully in the text, I think that since the preexisting statutory language in
the ADEA and other statutes could reasonably be interpreted consistently with the meaning
Congress endorsed in the other overrides, it would be appropriate to do so. The provision
overriding the holding of Martin is different because it was not interpreting preexisting text at all,
and accordingly, there is no comparable preexisting text in the ADEA, ADA, or other statutes.
224. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
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amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted
intentionally.”225 Ironically, Aramco was also the result of a hydra problem
concerning the relationship of Title VII and the ADEA, and the decision and
its subsequent history illustrate the risks in assuming that selective amendment is evidence of purposeful distinctions. Because the interpretive
question in Aramco is so similar to that posed by Gross, a brief description is
warranted. The question in the case was whether Title VII applied
extraterritorially to citizens.226 Title VII, as initially enacted in 1964, stated
that it would not apply to employers with respect to “employment of aliens
outside any State”;227 the ADEA, as initially enacted in 1967, lacked any
explicit reference to aliens and incorporated by reference228 language in the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that excluded “any employee whose
services . . . are performed in a workplace in a foreign country.”229 In the
early 1980s, some lower courts (reasonably) relied upon this distinction to
hold that Title VII did apply to citizens extraterritorially but that the ADEA
did not.230 In 1983, Congress held a hearing on the issue in which these
decisions were discussed,231 and in 1984, Congress amended the ADEA to
add explicit language applying the statute extraterritorially to citizens.232
Given this background, it is not surprising that Congress did not make

225. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256). In the same general
discussion, the Gross Court also cites Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997). Gross, 129 S.
Ct. at 2349. Although the Court in Lindh likewise determined that a variation was meaningful, the
decision contains a far more nuanced consideration of factors in the negotiation process that should
be considered before reaching such a conclusion. See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 329–30 (stating that the
difference might not be indicative of congressional intent if “the two chapters had evolved
separately in the congressional process”).
226. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246.
227. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2006)).
228. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7, 81 Stat.
602, 604 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006)) (incorporating FLSA’s procedural and
enforcement mechanisms).
229. See Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 608 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[FLSA § 13(f)] provides
that the acts covered by it shall not apply ‘to any employee whose services during the workweek are
performed in a workplace within a foreign country . . . .’” (alteration in original)).
230. See, e.g., Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1453, 1456–57 (D. Colo. 1983)
(holding that the ADEA does not apply extraterritorially), aff’d, 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984);
Cleary v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251, 1263 (D.N.J. 1983) (dismissing the case on the
grounds that the ADEA does not apply extraterritorially), aff’d, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984); Bryant
v. Int’l Schs. Servs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472, 482 (D.N.J. 1980) (holding that Title VII did apply
extraterritorially), rev’d on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982).
231. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Aging of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 1–2 (1983) (statement of Sen. Charles
E. Grassley, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Aging).
232. See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a), 98 Stat.
1767, 1792 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2006)) (adding to the ADEA: “[t]he term
‘employee’ includes any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer
in a workplace in a foreign country,” subject to limited exceptions to facilitate compliance with
foreign law).
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analogous changes to Title VII.233 In Aramco, decided in 1991, the Supreme
Court ignored this context completely and held that Title VII did not apply
extraterritorially in part because it lacked specific language comparable to
that that had been added to the ADEA in 1984.234 Congress swiftly
disagreed, overriding the decision seven months later in the 1991 CRA.235
Aramco is, in my terminology, a shadow precedent. I contend that its statements regarding the presumed significance of variation between statutes
should have no persuasive value. Rather, Aramco should perhaps be cited in
conjunction with the override for the contrary proposition that distinctions
between statutes frequently are not intentional.236 The Gross Court, however,
cited Aramco without qualification or acknowledgement that its holding had
been superseded.237
In Gross, the Court took a similarly blinkered approach to the
relationship between the ADEA and Title VII, once again ignoring the
significance of context when interpreting an override. The Court asserted
that because Congress “neglect[ed]” to add motivating-factor language to the
ADEA, it “cho[se]” to have the ADEA interpreted differently from
Title VII.238 Stated more generally, the Court’s reasoning implies the
counterintuitive conclusion that Congress disagreed with multiple judicial
interpretations of Title VII strongly enough to enact overrides superseding
them but “chose” to grant courts total freedom regarding how to interpret the
same language in the ADEA, ADA, and other employment statutes. I assert
that considering the 1991 CRA as a whole supports a different, and I think
233. It may also have been significant that the amendment to the ADEA regarding
extraterritoriality was an addition to a bill that primarily amended a different statute concerning
older Americans, making any potential amendment of Title VII particularly unlikely.
234. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1991).
235. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f) (2006)) (explicitly stating in the definition of
employee that “[w]ith respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual
who is a citizen of the United States,” subject to limited exceptions to facilitate compliance with
foreign law).
236. The fact that the 1991 Congress overrode the decision does not resolve definitively
whether the 1964 Congress that enacted Title VII or the 1984 Congress that amended the ADEA
intended Title VII to apply extraterritorially. It does, however, suggest that the inference of
meaningful variation may well be unwarranted.
237. In a further odd twist, in 1983, Justice Thomas (the author of the Gross majority opinion)
was Chairman of the EEOC. Clarence Thomas, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/
bios/clarencethomas.html (listing Clarence Thomas as the EEOC’s eighth Chairman, and stating
that he served from May 6, 1982, to March 8, 1990). In that capacity, he testified to the
subcommittee considering amending the ADEA, arguing that Title VII already permitted
extraterritorial application—in other words, he disagreed with the conclusion subsequently reached
by the Supreme Court in Aramco. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 3 (1983)
(statement of Clarence Thomas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). At the
time then-Chairman Thomas testified, the analysis differed from the precise question faced by the
Court in Aramco because it predated Congress’s addition of explicit language regarding the
ADEA’s extraterritoriality; nonetheless, the implicit flip in position is still striking.
238. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349, 2350 n.3 (2009).
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far more plausible, conclusion: Congress consistently assumed that amending
Title VII would be sufficient to end reliance on disfavored judicial interpretations of language in Title VII and to signal that analogous provisions in
other statutes should be interpreted in line with the meaning accorded to the
relevant language by Congress. This latter proposition accords well with the
1991 CRA’s other substantive amendments (those not made in response to
specific judicial interpretations), which increased consistency in the remedial
and procedural rules applied to the various employment discrimination
statutes.239 It also is exactly what the committee report asserts—that is, that
the committee “intends that these other laws [banning discrimination and]
modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent
with Title VII as amended by this Act.”240
Of course, it is impossible to know whether this sentence in the
committee report accurately represents the intention of a majority of the 1991
Congress. It could be that proponents of the overrides were able to muster
sufficient votes to amend Title VII but that they lacked support to amend
even the most obvious other potentially-affected laws. I contend, however,
that it is likely they simply thought it was unnecessary. In 1991, as opposed
to today, it was probably reasonable for congressional drafters to assume that
statements in committee reports would be deemed significant by courts.
Now that would be far less true.241 But in arguing that “because of” in the
ADEA should be interpreted consistently with the meaning that Congress
afforded that language in Title VII—i.e., that it prescribes a motivating-factor
test—I am not urging that legislative history be used to trump statutory text
or to go beyond the language of the statute. That is not necessary because, as
the next part demonstrates, the preexisting text can easily bear the meaning
Congress signaled it preferred. Even jurists who categorically reject any
consideration of legislative history could reach the result that I advocate
simply by interpreting the plain text of the ADEA and recognizing the
independent value of promoting the consistent and coherent development of
statutory law.
IV. Causation in Employment Discrimination Law: An (Imaginary)
Alternative Story
The path from Price Waterhouse to the 1991 CRA to Desert Palace to
Gross, including the surprising U-turn in Gross, illustrates the peculiar
challenges implicit in the interpretation of statutory overrides. Judicial and
academic commentary regarding overrides consistently characterizes them as
a means for Congress to “correct” judicial interpretations with which it
239. See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text.
240. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697.
241. Cf. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 990 n.j (collecting scholarly commentary both
skeptical of and sympathetic to the Supreme Court’s more cautious use of legislative history during
the past two decades).
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disagrees.242 Implicit in such statements is the fundamental recognition that
there are often two or more plausible interpretations of statutory language. If
an override “clarifies” statutory language by adopting a meaning that the
preexisting statutory language could comfortably bear, it arguably functions
as an interpretation of a statute by a higher “court”—except that it is not a
court at all but, instead, the legislature. In this respect, overrides differ
significantly from new legislation or other kinds of amendments that correct
mistakes in statutes or respond to new or unanticipated problems. When
interpreting such overrides, the conclusions and inferences drawn by courts
should reflect these realities (as I contend the approach taken by the Supreme
Court in Gross did not). Part VI proposes an alternative approach. But first,
it is helpful to illustrate just how significant these distinctions are by
considering how the issue in Gross would have been resolved if it had been a
subsequent Supreme Court decision, rather than Congress, that superseded
Price Waterhouse’s interpretation of Title VII.
A. A Judicial Interpretation of Title VII Establishing a Motivating-Factor
Causation Standard with a Limitation on Remedies
Imagine that Congress did not respond to Price Waterhouse in the 1991
Civil Rights Act. Imagine instead that a different case arises, maybe ten
years after Price Waterhouse, in which a different woman, call her Beth,
claims that she was denied a promotion at least in part because of her sex.
Unlike Ann Hopkins, however, there is no direct evidence that sex played a
role in the decision; rather, there is simply extensive circumstantial evidence.
Beth sues her employer under Title VII. The trial court refuses to issue
a motivating-factor instruction on the grounds that Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence provides the controlling opinion in Price Waterhouse.243 Beth
appeals. The circuit court reverses on the ground that Justice White’s
concurrence was controlling. Imagine that by now there is a significant
circuit split regarding whether direct evidence is required to shift the burden
in a mixed-motive case. Beth’s employer appeals, and the Supreme Court
grants certiorari. As in Price Waterhouse, the Court understands that
resolution of the matter turns on the interpretation of “because of” in

242. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982) (“The remedy for
any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress and not with this Court.”);
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (“If there is any inconsistency or illogic in all this, it is an
inconsistency and illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this
Court.”); ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 151 (“[D]ynamic statutory interpretation, even against
legislative expectations, is subject to override by the legislature and in fact may even be a stimulus
to legislative deliberation.”); Marshall, supra note 25, at 208–15 (arguing for absolute statutory
stare decisis so that Congress will know it is responsible for correcting interpretations with which it
disagrees).
243. This assumes that sometime between Price Waterhouse and Beth’s case Congress acted
(as it did in 1991) to permit jury trials under Title VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006))
(permitting jury trials). If it had not, the reasoning discussed above could apply in a bench trial.
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Title VII. The Court deems the plurality and concurring opinions in Price
Waterhouse to be highly instructive. But, as is typical after a fractured
opinion, the Court returns to the matter determined to establish a clear rule
that can garner majority support and with the benefit of having seen how the
approaches articulated in the prior opinion played out in the real world.
Recall that in Price Waterhouse, the plurality and Justice White’s
concurrence held that showing that sex played a “motivating” role in an
employment decision was sufficient to shift the burden to the defendant to
prove that it would have taken the same action anyway, and that neither
opinion required direct evidence.244 It is fair to assume, as well, that in the
years between Price Waterhouse and Beth’s (hypothetical) case, lower courts
that tried to apply Justice O’Connor’s direct-evidence standard had found it
unwieldy (as indeed they did).245 In Beth’s case, a majority of the Court
clarifies that a plaintiff can establish liability by showing that sex, race, or
another impermissible criterion was a “motivating” factor in a decision and
that a plaintiff may use any kind of evidence to do so. Thus, so far the
Court’s holding in Beth’s case merely ratifies a fair reading of Price
Waterhouse if one deems Justice White’s concurrence controlling because it
provides a fifth vote for the motivating-factor standard.246
The majority in Beth’s case then goes beyond Price Waterhouse to hold
that a showing by the employer that it would have taken the same action in
any event does not avoid liability; rather, it only reduces remedies. This is a
change from Price Waterhouse. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price
Waterhouse argued that the causation standard articulated by the plurality
was internally inconsistent in that it explicitly rejected a but-for causation
standard but then implicitly adopted that standard by permitting employers to
escape liability entirely if they could show that they would have taken the
same action.247 The new majority in Beth’s case decides there is merit in this
argument. But rather than adopting the consistent but-for standard Justice
Kennedy had advocated, the majority in Beth’s case decides it is essential
that “because of” consistently means “motivating factor.” Accordingly, it
holds that the plurality in Price Waterhouse was mistaken in interpreting
Title VII to permit an affirmative defense to liability once a plaintiff has
proven that an illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in a decision.
Nonetheless, the majority wants to avoid providing a windfall to
plaintiffs and unfairly penalizing defendants who would have taken the same
action even if they had not considered the illegitimate factor. The majority

244. See supra notes 112–19 and accompanying text.
245. See Harper, supra note 8, at 102–04 (documenting disagreement among lower courts on
how to apply the “direct-evidence” standard).
246. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining that the dissenting justices in Gross
held Justice White’s concurrence controlling).
247. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 285 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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realizes that Title VII’s remedial provisions adequately address this concern.
Even prior to the 1991 CRA, Title VII stated,
No order of the court shall require the . . . hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of
any back pay, if such individual was . . . refused employment or
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) [the antiretaliation
provision] of this title.248
Before Price Waterhouse was decided, several circuits had relied on this
remedial language in mixed-motive contexts to hold that a showing that sex,
race, or another prohibited factor played a role in an employment decision
was sufficient to establish liability, but that backpay and reinstatement would
not be available if an employer could prove it would have taken the same
action absent discrimination.249 The plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse
rejected this interpretation, holding that this limitation on remedies was not
applicable in individual mixed-motive cases because prior Supreme Court
precedent had interpreted it as pertaining to class actions or pattern-orpractice cases.250
The majority in Beth’s case, however, reconsiders this determination. It
notes that the plain language of the provision seems quite apt for balancing
the competing objectives at stake in mixed-motive cases. This interpretation
would permit a court to order injunctive relief, such as a prohibition on
considering an applicant’s femininity, if a plaintiff establishes that sex was a
motivating factor in a decision.251 But if a defendant established that the
plaintiff would not have been promoted anyway, she would not receive back
pay or front pay or be promoted. The majority determines that it is
appropriate to place the burden on making this “same action” showing on the

248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (emphasis added).
249. See, e.g., Fadhl v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that litigants can establish liability by showing sex was a “significant factor” in a decision
but that back pay and reinstatement are not available if an employer proves it would have made the
same decision absent discrimination); Patterson v. Greenwood Sch. Dist. 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th
Cir. 1982) (holding that a victim of discrimination is not eligible for back pay or reinstatement if the
employer can prove “by clear and convincing evidence” it would have taken the same action absent
discrimination (internal quotation marks omitted)); Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (same); King v. Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 443 F.2d 273, 278–79 (6th Cir. 1971)
(holding that a victim of discrimination is not eligible for back pay or reinstatement if the employer
can prove it had a lawful nondiscriminatory motivation for its actions that “considered by itself”
would have resulted in the same action). In her brief to the Supreme Court, Ann Hopkins relied on
this statutory language and some of these decisions to argue that an employer’s showing it would
have taken the same action should limit remedies rather than serve as an affirmative defense. See
Brief for Respondent at 31–43, Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (No. 87-1167), 1988 WL 1025872.
250. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45 n.10 (plurality opinion).
251. Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not explicitly reference “declaratory relief,” but this could be
included within the general authorization of “any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
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defendant, since it can most readily present evidence concerning its decisionmaking process. This interpretation achieves Title VII’s dual remedial
objectives of making plaintiffs whole (but not providing unwarranted relief)
and deterring future discrimination.252 Finally, citing Title VII’s attorneys’
fees provision, which also preexisted the 1991 CRA,253 the majority specifies
that a plaintiff who succeeds on showing that the employment practice was
motivated at least in part by a prohibited factor may recover attorneys’ fees
and costs related to that claim, even if she ultimately is not eligible for hiring,
promotion, reinstatement, or back pay.
Thus, the Court in Beth’s case ultimately concludes that a plaintiff can
succeed in a mixed-motive claim under Title VII by proving (using either
direct or circumstantial evidence) that race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin was a motivating factor in an employment decision, but her remedies
will be limited if an employer proves it would have taken the same action
anyway. In other words, the interpretation of Title VII announced by the
majority in Beth’s case—based entirely on the text of Title VII as it existed
prior to the enactment of the 1991 CRA—is precisely the standard adopted
by Congress in the 1991 CRA.254 Of course, the story imagined above is not
the only way that the Supreme Court, faced with a case like Beth’s, could
rule—but it is at least an entirely plausible interpretation of Title VII’s
preexisting statutory language.
B. Application of the Judicial Interpretation of Title VII to the ADEA
Now imagine that some years after Beth’s case is decided, Jack Gross
brings his suit under the ADEA contending that he was demoted at least in
part because of his age.
He presents circumstantial evidence of
discrimination but no direct evidence. Assume that the Supreme Court
grants certiorari. The Supreme Court in this imaginary story, like the actual
Supreme Court in Gross, would need to determine whether the standard of
causation applicable in mixed-motive claims under Title VII also applies to
the ADEA. This analysis would differ considerably from that actually

252. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–19 (1975) (explaining that the
purpose of Title VII is to force companies to eliminate discriminatory employment practices and to
“make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination”).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988).
254. There is actually one subtle difference. The remedial provision as it existed prior to the
1991 CRA, now subsection (g)(2)(A), refers not only to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
but also to the antiretaliation provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988) (precluding certain
remedies if action was taken “for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title”); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988) (prohibiting retaliation). Accordingly, the decision issued by the
majority in Beth’s case would naturally have applied to the antiretaliation provisions as well as the
substantive provisions of Title VII. Even prior to Gross, lower courts were divided over whether
the language added by the 1991 CRA to respond to Price Waterhouse applies to the antiretaliation
provisions. See, e.g., Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 933 & n.23 (3d Cir. 1997)
(providing examples of lower court decisions reaching opposite conclusions on this issue).
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applied by the Court in Gross because there would be no congressional
action with respect to Title VII, and no “failure” of congressional action with
respect to the ADEA, to justify departing from the judicial interpretation of
analogous language in Title VII.
As discussed above, the ADEA’s substantive language was derived in
haec verba from Title VII.255 This is a strong argument for interpreting
“because of” in the ADEA the same way that the (hypothetical) Court in
Beth’s case interpreted the language in Title VII—i.e., to prescribe the
motivating-factor test with a limitation on remedies if the employer proved it
would have taken the same action anyway. The Court might also note that
the policies of the statutes are also quite similar256 and that there is an
independent virtue in interpreting the ADEA consistently with Title VII
because it is relatively common for an individual to challenge a single
employment action under both statutes.257
The Court, however, might be given pause by two arguably relevant
differences between the statutes. First, although the ADEA’s substantive
provisions are largely derived from Title VII, its remedial provisions
incorporate by reference the FLSA rather than Title VII.258 Thus, the Court
deciding the ADEA case would not be interpreting language that was
precisely the same as the remedial language in Title VII. The relevant
remedial language that applies to the ADEA, however, is quite flexible,
providing that employers “shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the relevant] section,” as
well as for attorneys’ fees.259 This flexible language would permit the Court
to adopt a standard, like that adopted with respect to Title VII in Beth’s case,
limiting a defendant’s exposure on remedies if it could show that it would
have taken the same action regardless of consideration of age.
The second relevant textual difference between Title VII and the ADEA
is more significant—and it is one that arguably should have factored into the
Court’s analysis in Gross itself, although neither the majority opinion nor the
dissents addressed it. The ADEA’s prohibition on discrimination “because
of [an] individual’s age” parallels Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination
“because of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”260
A separate section of the ADEA provides that “[i]t shall not be unlawful” for
any employer “to take any action otherwise prohibited” by the key substan-

255. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (“In fact, the prohibitions of the ADEA were
derived in haec verba from Title VII.”).
256. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (stating that the ADEA and
Title VII “share a common purpose”).
257. See infra text accompanying notes 332–36 (describing the confusion regarding the
standard of proof following Gross in cases where plaintiffs bring cases under both the ADEA and
Title VII).
258. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006).
259. Id. § 216(b).
260. Id. § 623(a)(1).
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tive provisions “where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age” (typically known as the RFOA defense).261 Title VII does not
include analogous language. It could be argued that adopting the standard
articulated by the majority in Beth’s case—that a decision based on age is
unlawful when age was a motivating factor in the decision even if the
defendant proves it would have taken the same action anyway—would be in
tension with this provision. An appropriate means of reconciling these
provisions might be to state that in the ADEA, as opposed to in Title VII, a
showing by an employer that it would have taken the same action regardless
of any consideration of age would be a complete defense rather than simply a
limitation on remedies—in other words, that the ADEA would be governed
by the standard announced in Price Waterhouse.
This would be a relatively small difference between the causation
standard under Title VII and that of the ADEA. Additionally, even if
Congress disagreed with this interpretation of the ADEA, it could readily
modify the ADEA to signal that it should be interpreted consistently with
Title VII. (This assumes that the interpretive conventions that I propose in
Part VI were adopted in place of the rule announced in Gross. Otherwise,
amending the ADEA to address this issue could cause a hydra problem, just
as Congress’s actual amendment of Title VII to address Price Waterhouse
caused a hydra problem.) Notably, whether or not the ADEA was interpreted
slightly differently from Title VII, interpretation of other related statutes

261. Id. § 623(f)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted the RFOA provision as narrowing
disparate impact liability under the ADEA. See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct.
2395, 2404 (2008) (replacing the “business necessity” test applicable in disparate impact cases
under Title VII with a requirement that a defendant must prove only that a challenged action was
based on a “reasonable factor other than age”); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S 228, 239 (2005)
(“It is, accordingly, in cases involving disparate impact claims that the RFOA provision plays its
principal role by precluding liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor that
was ‘reasonable.’”). Justice Thomas disagreed with this analysis, contending that disparate impact
liability was not available under the ADEA at all. See Meacham, 128 S. Ct. at 2407 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I write separately to note that I continue to believe that
disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the [ADEA].”); Smith, 544 U.S. at 248
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas) (“I would . . .
affirm the judgment below on the ground that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the
ADEA.”). In Smith, Justice Thomas (and also Justice Kennedy) joined a concurrence authored by
Justice O’Connor that adopts the interpretation of the RFOA that I imagine above. The concurrence
answers the majority’s contention that absent disparate impact liability, the RFOA would be
unnecessary, id. at 238–39 (majority opinion), by explaining that
the RFOA provision . . . plays a distinct (and clearly nonredunant) role in “mixed
motive” cases. In such cases, an adverse action taken in substantial part because of an
employee’s age may be “otherwise prohibited” by § 4(a). The RFOA exemption makes
clear that such conduct is nevertheless lawful so long as it is “based on” a reasonable
factor other than age.
Id. at 253 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citations omitted). This interpretation of the
RFOA exemption is obviously hard to square with Justice Thomas’s subsequent opinion (joined by
Justice Kennedy) in Gross that mixed-motive claims are not available under the ADEA at all.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
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would almost certainly start from the Court’s interpretation of Title VII (that
is, Beth’s case) rather than the modified standard applied in the ADEA.
C. The Significance of This Alternative Story
This thought experiment demonstrates two important principles. First,
the causation standard governing Title VII adopted by Congress in the 1991
CRA was a perfectly plausible interpretation of the language of Title VII as it
preexisted the 1991 CRA. This is not surprising, since in many respects the
1991 CRA simply codifies the judicial interpretation of Title VII in Price
Waterhouse.262 For this reason, as discussed more fully in Part VI, I assert
that the override should be understood as a clarifying gloss on the meaning of
the preexisting language—that is, “because of”—rather than a substantive
addition to Title VII that creates a meaningful variation between Title VII
and other employment statutes that lack this language.
The second important principle demonstrated by this thought
experiment is the asymmetry implicit in the Court’s treatment of
congressional interpretations versus its own interpretations. If Congress had
not overridden Price Waterhouse but instead a later Supreme Court had
interpreted the language of Title VII analogously to how Congress amended
it in 1991, the later Court interpretation of Title VII would almost certainly
govern the interpretation of the ADEA (possibly as modified by the RFOA
provision). This would be true even if the Court interpreted just the language
of Title VII. In fact, a judicial holding that affirmatively reached the ADEA
in a Title VII case might be castigated as improperly going beyond the case
presented to the Court. Additionally, if neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court had returned to the standard governing mixed-motive cases under
Title VII (that is, if the hypothetical Beth’s case had never been decided), it
is likely that Price Waterhouse would have been deemed controlling on the
interpretation of analogous language in the ADEA.
It is important to note explicitly that this analysis assumes that the Court
disinterestedly applies its precedents and general principles of statutory
interpretation. As discussed above, a large body of empirical literature
suggests, by contrast, that ideology often plays a significant role in
determining the outcome of Supreme Court decisions.263 If the hypothetical
Supreme Court deciding the hypothetical Jack Gross’s case had a proemployer preference, it theoretically could point to the small differences in
statutory language discussed above to distinguish Beth’s hypothetical case
and interpret the ADEA to require but-for causation. Alternatively, it could
explicitly overrule Beth’s hypothetical case. But I assert that it would be
relatively unlikely to either distinguish or overrule Beth’s case (or, if Beth’s
case had not been decided, Price Waterhouse) because it would be difficult

262. See discussion supra subpart III(B).
263. See supra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text.
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to provide a credible justification for doing so. In Price Waterhouse itself,
the dissent by Justice Kennedy assumed that the judicial interpretation of
Title VII would also apply to the ADEA.264 It is the fact that Congress
intervened that permitted the Supreme Court in Gross to interpret language in
the ADEA quite differently from analogous language in Title VII without
blatantly violating standard principles of statutory interpretation and stare
decisis.
The difference in outcomes between the real story and this alternative
imaginary story is not inappropriate if the Gross Court’s assertion that
Congress affirmatively “chose” to have the ADEA interpreted differently
from Title VII is correct, or at least if it is unproblematic to interpret a failure
to amend the ADEA as an implicit choice by Congress to have the ADEA
interpreted differently. If it were relatively easy for Congress to indicate—in
a manner that would control future judicial interpretations without creating
new problems—that similar language in other statutes should be interpreted
in line with the amendments it made to Title VII, the onus the Gross Court
places on Congress to do so might be reasonable. The problem, as the next
part shows, is that these assumptions are deeply flawed.
V.

The Hydra Problem Illustrated

In Gross, the Supreme Court suggested that the only way Congress
could have ensured that its preferred interpretation of “because of” in
Title VII was applied to other statutes was to amend all other statutes that
include comparable language.265 This part demonstrates how difficult this
would be by showing how quickly Gross has been applied to numerous other
statutes. Recognizing the difficulty in separately amending all of these
statutes, Congress has considered bills that would override Gross and use a
blanket amendment to govern the causation standard in “any” federal law
forbidding employment discrimination or retaliation.266 This approach is
probably reasonable in light of the reasoning in Gross, but it would create a
host of new problems. This part explores the messy aftermath of Gross;
Part VI proposes a different approach.

264. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 292 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“Confusion in the application of dual burden-shifting mechanisms will be most acute in cases
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), where
courts borrow the Title VII order of proof for the conduct of jury trials.”). Justice Stevens makes
this very point in his dissenting opinion in Gross. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343,
2354 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Price Waterhouse assumed the
plurality’s [Title VII] mixed-motives framework extended to the ADEA . . . .”).
265. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349 (“We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to amend Title VII’s
relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA. When Congress amends one
statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”); cf. Katz, supra note
8, at 884 (arguing that due to the Court’s antiunification stance in Gross, it will likely “reject
burden-shifting in any statute that does not expressly require it”).
266. E.g., Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. § 3
(1st Sess. 2009); see also discussion infra subpart V(C).
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A. Application of Gross to Non-ADEA Federal Statutes
The root of the hydra problem in employment discrimination is a web of
similar federal and state statutes prohibiting certain conduct by employers.
As discussed above, Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”267 and a separate
provision prohibits discrimination against an individual “because” she
opposes or complains about discriminatory actions.268 The ADEA prohibits
employment discrimination “because of such individual’s age,”269 and a
separate provision prohibits discrimination “because” she has sought to
enforce rights under the ADEA.270 The ADA, as originally enacted,
prohibited discrimination against an individual “because of the disability of
such individual,”271 and a separate provision prohibits discrimination
“because” an individual has sought to enforce her rights under the statute.272
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,273 the Immigration Reform
and Control Act,274 the Occupational Safety and Health Act,275 and the
Energy Reorganization Act276 are examples of the wide range of additional
federal statutes that use “because” or “because of” as the operative causal
language to prohibit discrimination. Numerous other federal statutes,
including § 1981,277 § 1983,278 the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA),279 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),280 and

267. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
268. Id. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added).
269. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
270. Id. § 623(d) (emphasis added).
271. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102(a), 104 Stat. 327,
331 (emphasis added). This was the original language of the ADA. In 2008, the ADA was
amended and this operative language was changed to prohibit discrimination “on the basis of
disability,” probably for reasons unrelated to the issue of mixed motives that is a focus here. ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. II 2009)).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
273. Id. § 2000ff-1(a) (Supp. III 2010) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee
“because of genetic information with respect to the employee”).
274. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee
“because of such individual’s national origin, or . . . because of such individual’s citizenship
status”).
275. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee “because”
such employee files a complaint).
276. 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1)(D) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an employee
“because” such employee is participating in a proceeding under this chapter of the Atomic Energy
Act).
277. Id. § 1981(a) (providing equal rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property”).
278. Id. § 1983 (providing redress for deprivations of federal rights under color of state law).
279. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against an individual “for”
opposing practices made unlawful under the Act).
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the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act,281 do
not use the words “because of” in their operative language but likewise
prohibit discrimination against an individual, in what could colloquially be
referred to as “because of” certain factors or conduct.
As discussed in Part II, statutory provisions that are identical or similar
to each other in related areas are typically interpreted consistently.282 Prior to
Gross, lower courts were already split regarding whether to apply Price
Waterhouse or Title VII’s motivating-factor standard to employment
discrimination statutes other than Title VII.283 Gross complicates this picture
even more. Gross is a definitive statement by a true majority of the Supreme
Court that “because of” in the ADEA means that the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving through direct or circumstantial evidence that age was the
“but-for” cause of a challenged employment decision.284 Under standard
principles of statutory interpretation, lower courts must deem this
interpretation to be highly relevant when interpreting identical language in
other similar statutes. And the Gross Court’s reasoning—that this interpretation was appropriate because Congress failed to amend the ADEA when it
amended Title VII—can likewise be applied to all other statutes that were not
amended when Congress enacted the 1991 CRA. But because the Gross
Court did not explicitly overrule Price Waterhouse and because there are
small variations among the statutory provisions at issue, many lower courts
have been confused about how to proceed. There is a burgeoning split
among the circuits.
Immediately after Gross was decided, the Seventh Circuit took an
extremely aggressive approach to applying Gross to other federal statutes. It
first addressed the issue in a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court
rejected prior Supreme Court and circuit precedent that held that a plaintiff
needed to show only that protected speech was a motivating factor in a
decision285 and held instead, citing Gross, that the plaintiff needed to prove
but-for causation.286 The court went beyond this particular context, however,
to characterize Gross as establishing that “unless a statute (such as the Civil
Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is

280. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (prohibiting discrimination against participants in or beneficiaries of
employee benefit plans “for exercising” rights under covered plans or “for the purpose of
interfering” with an individual’s benefit rights).
281. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a)–(b) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of” uniformed
service or “because” an individual sought to enforce rights under the Act).
282. See supra subpart II(B).
283. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
284. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009) (“[T]he plaintiff
retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s
adverse action.”).
285. See Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that decisions so
holding “do not survive Gross”).
286. Id.
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part of the plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.”287 In a
subsequent ADA case, the circuit relied on this more general proposition to
hold that the standard there was also but-for causation; the court noted that,
unlike the ADEA, the ADA incorporates Title VII’s remedial provisions—
including § 706(g)(2)(B), the limitation on remedies in mixed-motive
cases—but held that since it did not similarly incorporate § 703(m), the
mixed-motive liability standard, or include “comparable stand-alone
language,” Gross’s interpretation of “because of” controlled.288 The Seventh
Circuit likewise applied Gross to the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, which prohibits discrimination against employees “for
exercising any right,” on the ground that dictionary definitions equate “for”
with “by reason of” and “because of.”289 These cases at least had the virtue
of establishing a clear rule (albeit one I contend is unwarranted). But just as
this Article was being finalized for publication, a Seventh Circuit decision
held that the first case in this chain was unjustified in concluding that Gross
overruled the motivating-factor standard previously applied to First
Amendment retaliation cases and reinstated the old standard for First
Amendment claims.290 The latest decision, however, did not disavow the
ADA or LMRDA precedents; rather, it cited them in support of a statement
(probably appropriately characterized as dicta) that although Gross did not
change the causation standard for First Amendment retaliation claims,
“Gross may have implications for suits under other statutes as well” as the
ADEA.291
Other circuits have been more measured in their initial responses to
Gross. The Fifth Circuit, for example, held that retaliation claims under
Title VII were governed by Price Waterhouse rather than Gross.292 The
court acknowledged that Gross’s reasoning might suggest that retaliation
claims under Title VII, which similarly arise from discrimination “because
of” protected acts293 and which were not addressed explicitly in the provisions added by the 1991 CRA, likewise require a showing of but-for
causation.294 But the court relied instead on Gross’s admonition that courts

287. Id. at 525–26 (emphasis added).
288. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff
. . . must show that his or her employer would not have fired him but for his . . . disability.”).
289. Serafinn v. Local 722, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 914–15 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 529 (2006) and 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 25 (1989)).
290. Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that if a plaintiff in a First
Amendment retaliation case shows his speech was a motivating factor in the adverse action, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show it would have taken the same action anyway); see also
Brown v. Cnty. of Cook, 661 F.3d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 2011) (same). The Greene court also collected
several post-Gross decisions from other circuits that likewise continue to apply the motivatingfactor standard to First Amendment claims. Greene, 660 F.3d at 977–78.
291. Greene, 660 F.3d at 977.
292. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 329 (5th Cir. 2010).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
294. Xerox, 602 F.3d at 328.
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“must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different
statute without careful and critical examination.”295 Prior Fifth Circuit precedent held that Price Waterhouse, including Justice O’Connor’s directevidence requirement, was applicable to retaliation claims under Title VII.296
Citing a rule that it could not overrule prior circuit precedent “unless such
overruling is unequivocally directed by controlling Supreme Court
precedent,” the court distinguished Gross, which had not explicitly overruled
Price Waterhouse’s construction of “because of” in Title VII, from Desert
Palace, which it construed as having unequivocally overruled the directevidence requirement, to hold that retaliation claims under Title VII could
proceed under a mixed-motive framework as articulated in Price Waterhouse
but without the direct-evidence requirement.297 One member of the panel
filed a dissent, citing the Seventh Circuit precedent discussed above and
calling the majority’s distinguishing of Gross “lame.”298
Some district courts in other circuits have followed the Fifth Circuit’s
approach,299 while others have applied the reasoning in Gross to preclude
mixed-motive analysis in Title VII retaliation claims.300 And at least one
district court suggested that, even after Gross, mixed-motive Title VII retaliation claims are properly assessed using the motivating-factor language
added to Title VII by the 1991 CRA.301
The interpretive challenges posed by the ADA are similar to those at
play in the Title VII retaliation context, with the added wrinkle, noted above,
that the ADA incorporates by reference Title VII’s remedial provisions,
including the limitation on remedies applicable to mixed-motive claims
under Title VII.302 As initially enacted, the ADA prohibited discrimination
“because of” an individual’s disability or “because” an individual sought to

295. Id. at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted).
296. See id. at 330 (citing Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir.
2003) and Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 2001)).
297. Id. at 329–32 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
298. Id. at 337 (Jolly, J., dissenting). A more recent Fifth Circuit decision, with a far more
cursory analysis of the issue, reaffirmed Xerox but stated that the burden subsequently shifts back to
the employee to prove but-for causation. See Nunley v. City of Waco, No. 11-50119, 2011 WL
3861678, *5 (5th Cir. Sept. 1, 2011) (“Thus, our decision in Xerox did not dispense with this final
‘but for’ requirement for avoiding summary judgment.”). The court supported this assertion with a
cite to a retaliation claim analyzed under the pretext framework rather than the mixed-motive
framework. See id. (quoting Manaway v. Med. Ctr., 430 F. App’x 317 (5th Cir. 2011)); Manaway,
430 F. App’x at 325 n.4 (holding that the plaintiff waived her mixed-motive theory because she
failed to assert it prior to appeal). This suggests that the Nunley court perhaps did not appreciate the
extent to which these causation standards differ. See supra subpart III(A).
299. See, e.g., Nuskey v. Hochberg, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2010) (announcing that the
court would follow the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in Smith v. Xerox Corp.).
300. See, e.g., Beckford v. Geithner, 661 F. Supp. 2d 17, 25 n.3 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that a
mixed-motive theory could not be used in a suit involving the antiretaliation provision of Title VII).
301. Beckham v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 736 F. Supp. 2d 130, 145 (D.D.C. 2010).
302. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006) (incorporating Title VII’s remedies).
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enforce rights under the Act;303 it was amended shortly before Gross was
decided (to override different Supreme Court cases limiting the scope of
qualifying disabilities) and now prohibits discrimination “on the basis of”
disability.304 Prior to Gross, most circuits had held that the ADA permitted
mixed-motive claims, with most applying the 1991 CRA’s motivating-factor
standard with a limitation on remedies but others applying Justice
O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse.305 But since Gross, the trend
seems to be to hold that mixed-motive claims are no longer cognizable under
the ADA. As noted above, the Seventh Circuit held this explicitly,306 and the
Second Circuit, without deciding the issue, characterized it as “questionable”
whether mixed-motive claims remain permissible.307 Several district courts
have likewise held that the ADA now requires plaintiffs to prove but-for
causation,308 although a few continue to apply pre-Gross circuit precedent
permitting mixed-motive claims.309 Few of these decisions analyze the
amended ADA (because it became effective relatively shortly before this
Article was published), but an administrative decision from the Merit
Systems Protection Board concludes that the amendment does not
substantively change the analysis and the ADA no longer permits mixedmotive claims.310
A related but somewhat different set of issues arises with respect to
§ 1981. Section 1981 was enacted shortly after the Civil War, and it provides that “all persons . . . shall have the same right, in every State and

303. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102, 104 Stat. 327, 331–
33 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006)) (prohibiting discrimination “against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination “because” an individual opposes or participates in a
challenge to discriminatory acts).
304. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. II 2009) (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified
individual “on the basis of disability”).
305. See, e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1063–65 (9th Cir. 2005) (interpreting
“because of” to require proof that disability was a “motivating factor” in a decision and collecting
cases from seven other circuits also permitting mixed-motive claims under similar standards); cf.
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001) (suggesting, without clearly
deciding, that Price Waterhouse might govern the analysis). By contrast, the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits never permitted mixed-motive claims under the ADA, reasoning that the statute was
partially modeled on the Rehabilitation Act, which precludes mixed-motive claims. See Macy v.
Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 357, 363 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining the circuit split on this
point).
306. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 960–62 (7th Cir. 2010)
(imposing a but-for standard).
307. Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010).
308. See, e.g., Saviano v. Town of Westport, No. 3:04-CV-522 RNC, 2001 WL 4561184, at *6
(D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2011); Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 719 F. Supp. 2d 484, 503 (E.D. Pa.
2010); Ross v. Indep. Living Res. of Contra Costa Cnty., No. C08-00854 TEH, 2010 WL 2898773,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (all adopting a but-for standard).
309. See, e.g., Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 & n.40
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying a motivating-factor standard but noting that the plaintiff’s proof would
satisfy a but-for standard as well).
310. Southerland v. DOD, 2011 M.S.P.B. 92, at *16–17 (2011).
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Territory . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”311 Although it does not explicitly mention employment, this
language has long been interpreted to protect against race-based employment
discrimination.312 In general, courts have interpreted § 1981’s substantive
reach to be largely coterminous with Title VII’s, although its procedural
requirements and remedies differ.313 Courts have generally applied Price
Waterhouse to permit mixed-motive claims under § 1981 and most continued
to apply Price Waterhouse even after the 1991 CRA, reasoning that Congress
had failed to amend § 1981 in this respect.314 This reasoning could suggest
that Gross’s reasoning is now applicable instead. But the Third Circuit
suggested (without formally deciding) that it might well continue to apply
Price Waterhouse on the ground that § 1981 does not include the “because
of” language interpreted in Gross.315 The court explained that burden
shifting is appropriate, reasoning that if race played “any role” in a
challenged decision, the plaintiff has not enjoyed “the same right” as other
similarly situated persons, but if the defendant proves the same decision
would have been made regardless, “then the plaintiff has, in effect, enjoyed
‘the same right’ as similarly situated persons.”316
It is not even clear what causation standard to apply to claims brought
by federal employees under the ADEA itself. These claims are not governed
by the language governing private employers interpreted by the Court in
Gross but instead by a separate provision of the ADEA, § 633a(a), which
provides that all personnel decisions affecting federal employees “shall be
311. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
312. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 448 (2008) (citing cases back to
1977 in which federal appeals courts concluded that the language of § 1981 encompassed
employment retaliation claims); id. at 457 (holding that § 1981 encompasses retaliation claims);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (holding that § 1981, like Title VII,
“is applicable to racial discrimination in private employment against white persons”).
313. See CBOCS, 553 U.S. at 455 (stating that there is a “necessary overlap” between Title VII
and § 1981 but that “the remedies available [under the two statutes], although related, and although
directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The key substantive difference between the statutes is that disparate impact claims are
not cognizable under § 1981. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391
(1982) (“We conclude, therefore, that § 1981 . . . can be violated only by purposeful
discrimination.”).
314. See Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment, supra note 12, at 647 n.22 (collecting cases in
which courts refused to apply the 1991 CRA framework to § 1981 claims); see also Brown v.
J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying the Price Waterhouse framework
instead of the 1991 Title VII amendments to a § 1981 claim); Aquino v. Honda of Am., Inc., 158 F.
App’x 667, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (refusing to extend the 1991 Title VII amendments to § 1981
claims); Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 176 F.3d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the 1991 mixed-motive amendments do not apply to § 1981 claims); Hardy v. Town of
Greenwich, 629 F. Supp. 2d 192, 199 (D. Conn. 2009) (citing Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919,
933–34 (9th Cir. 2007)) (noting that while the Second Circuit has not directly addressed whether the
1991 mixed-motive amendments apply to § 1981 claims, other circuits have addressed the issue,
and only the Ninth Circuit has held that the 1991 amendments apply to § 1981).
315. Brown, 581 F.3d at 182 n.5.
316. Id.
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made free from any discrimination based on age.”317 Citing prior Supreme
Court precedent that had referred to the “sharp” differences between these
provisions, the D.C. Circuit held that reading § 633a to require “but-for”
causation would “divorce” the phrase from its plain meaning and that a
federal employee could establish liability simply by “proving that age was a
factor in the employer’s decision.”318 The court further stated that “‘[a]ny,’
after all, means any” and that accordingly there was no requirement that age
be a substantial factor in the decision.319 Relying on the First Amendment
retaliation decision that was significant in Price Waterhouse’s analysis rather
than Price Waterhouse itself, the court then held that to avoid unwarranted
windfalls, a plaintiff could only recover back pay or reinstatement if but-for
causation were established, but the court declined to resolve which party
would bear the burden of proving the same action would, or would not, have
occurred.320 By contrast to this careful analysis, several district courts have
applied Gross to claims under § 633a without noting the difference in
language at all or have noted it but held it makes no difference.321 Similar
questions have also arisen under the Rehabilitation Act (which prohibits
discrimination “solely by reason of” a disability and retaliation “because of”
protected acts),322 the Jury Systems Improvement Act (which prohibits
discrimination “by reason of” jury service),323 and ERISA (which prohibits
discrimination “for” exercising rights under benefits plans).324

317. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
318. Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 205–06 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
319. Id. at 206.
320. Id. at 207 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285
(1977)). See supra text accompanying notes 249–50 (discussing a similar interpretation of remedies
under Title VII prior to Price Waterhouse).
321. See, e.g., Frankel v. Peake, Civ. No. 07-3539 (WJM), 2009 WL 3417448, at *4 (D.N.J.
Oct. 20, 2009) (citing Gross to hold that, in a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff needed to
“show a disputed material fact, which would allow a reasonable jury to determine that age was the
‘but for’ cause of the employment action at issue”); Wagner v. Geren, No. 8:08 CV 208, 2009 WL
2105680, at *4 (D. Neb. July 9, 2009) (stating that it is the plaintiff’s “burden to present evidence
. . . that . . . the adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ [the plaintiff’s] age”); Glenn v.
Bair, 643 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that “[a]t all times . . . the plaintiff retains the
burden of persuasion to prove . . . that age was the but-for cause of the challenged employer
decision” (internal quotations omitted)).
322. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); 34 C.F.R. 100.7(e) (2011); see, e.g., Gard v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
752 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Gross for the proposition that a “plaintiff seeking
vindication under the Rehabilitation Act must prove that his disability was the ‘sole’ or ‘but-for’
reason for the employer’s actions or inactions, regardless of whether the plaintiff advances a claim
of discrimination based on disparate treatment, mixed-motive, or retaliation”).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2006); see, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 103,
109 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Gross for the rule that a plaintiff must demonstrate that jury service was
the but-for cause of the challenged adverse employment action).
324. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); see, e.g., Cameron v. Idearc Media Corp., No. 08-12010-LTS,
2011 WL 4054864, at *5, *9 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2011) (citing Gross to hold that mixed-motive
claims are not cognizable under the ADEA and then stating “[t]he framework for analysis of the
Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim is essentially the same as that discussed . . . with regard to the ADEA
claim”).
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Agency interpretations can further complicate matters. For example,
the FMLA makes it unlawful to discriminate against any individual
“because” such individual files or participates in a proceeding relating to her
substantive rights and, in a separate provision, “for opposing any practice”
made illegal.325 These provisions substantively parallel the antiretaliation
provisions in Title VII but use slightly different wording.326 A Department of
Labor regulation that predates Gross interprets these provisions to mean that
employers “cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in
employment actions.”327 The Sixth Circuit, after Gross, reasoned that the
regulation’s language suggested that mixed-motive analysis was appropriate
and therefore applied Price Waterhouse.328 The Tenth Circuit, by contrast,
recently stated (without deciding) that after Gross “there is a substantial
question whether a mixed-motive analysis would apply in a retaliation claim
under the FMLA.”329 District courts in various other circuits have similarly
applied pre-Gross circuit precedent that applies Price Waterhouse to FMLA
retaliation claims but have noted that there are strong arguments that Gross
should apply instead.330
Time, or subsequent Supreme Court decisions, will gradually resolve
some of the confusion regarding the analysis of these statutes, but the sheer
number of different statutes involved, and the small differences in language
among them and even within them, ensure that clarity will not be quickly
forthcoming. Notably, even if courts uniformly applied Gross to all statutes
other than Title VII, Gross and its quickly multiplying progeny will also pose
a challenge any time a plaintiff seeks to bring a claim under both Title VII
and any of these other statutes. It is common practice to bring racediscrimination claims under Title VII and § 1981 because § 1981 provides a

325. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006).
326. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), (b) (2006) (specifying that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any
employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any
practice made unlawful by this subchapter” or “because such individual has filed any charge, or has
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding, under or related to this subchapter”), with 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing . . . .”).
327. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2008).
328. See Hunter v. Valley View Local Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the FMLA “authorizes claims in which an employer bases an employment decision on both
permissible and impermissible factors”); cf. Wilson v. Noble Drilling Servs., Inc., 405 F. App’x
909, 912 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting uncertainty as to whether the mixed-motive framework applies
in FMLA cases but declining to resolve the issue).
329. Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 1004 (10th Cir. 2011).
330. See Burgess v. JHM Hotels, LLC, C.A. No. 6:08-3919-HMH-BHH, 2010 WL 1493132, at
*6 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2010) (noting that there was a “serious question” as to whether the Price
Waterhouse mixed-motive framework survived Gross); Rasic v. City of Northlake, No. 08 C 104,
2009 WL 3150428, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2009) (“[T]here is a serious question as to whether the
mixed-motive theory of FMLA retaliation survives the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Gross . . . .”).
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more generous remedial scheme in certain respects.331 If § 1981 is
interpreted in line with Gross, these two claims will be assessed under
different causation standards. Plaintiffs also often bring claims under both
the ADEA and Title VII.332 Even prior to Gross, these kinds of
“intersectional” claims posed challenges because they required proceeding
under two distinct statutes and raised complex challenges regarding appropriate comparators, often a key element of proving an employment
discrimination claim.333 Gross, and the enhanced pleading standards
imposed by the Iqbal334 and Twombly335 decisions, make such compound
cases far more difficult. A plaintiff now may be required to plead facts
sufficient to support causal standards that are in tension (e.g., that a given
decision was based in part on sex and that age was the but-for cause of the
decision); some courts have responded by dismissing the ADEA claims
immediately.336 Even if a court permits both claims to go forward, the jury
would need to be charged on two different causal standards.337 The same is
true for a myriad of potential statutory combinations. This tension is not
simply a matter of clarification; it is the necessary result of Gross’s rejection
of the standard endorsed by Congress in the 1991 CRA. It will remain a
problem unless and until Congress overrides, or the Court overrules, Gross or
unless and until Congress amends Title VII.

331. See DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 316 (8th ed. 2010)
(stating that “as a practical matter, discrimination claims based on race or ancestry should be
brought under both § 1981 and Title VII” because under § 1981 compensatory and punitive
damages are uncapped and back-pay awards are not limited to two years).
332. See, e.g., Cathy Ventrell-Monsees, President, Workplace Fairness, Statement at the EEOC
Meeting: Age Discrimination in the 21st Century—Barriers to the Employment of Older Workers
(July 15, 2009), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-15-09/ventrell-monsees.cfm
(remarking that an “increasing number of older women and older minorities . . . pursue claims under
the ADEA and Title VII”).
333. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women
Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 103–06 (2003) (describing how older women face challenges in
proving prima facie disparate treatment on account of age or sex in situations where discrimination
is occurring because of both age and sex, and neither their older male nor their younger female
coworkers are being discriminated against). Courts disagree about how to analyze these claims.
For a case permitting age to be considered as a “plus” factor relevant in the Title VII analysis, see
Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
334. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
335. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
336. See Brian S. Clarke, Grossly Restricted Pleading: Twombly/Iqbal, Gross, and
Cannibalistic Facts in Compound Employment Discrimination Claims, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1101,
1103–04 & n.22 (giving examples of post-Gross cases in which courts have dismissed cases due to
pleadings of inconsistent facts for different theories of discrimination, as well as examples of courts
allowing cases to proceed despite inconsistent alternative theories).
337. Cf. Sherwyn & Heise, supra note 99, at 903 (finding differences in outcomes depending on
whether juries received a mixed-motive instruction or a pretext instruction).
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B. Application of Gross to State Employment Discrimination Statutes
State courts, and federal courts applying state employment
discrimination law, face a different challenge. Many states and localities
have enacted employment discrimination laws that prohibit age
discrimination in the same statute—often the same sentence—as they
prohibit race, color, sex, religion, and national-origin discrimination.338 State
statutes also often prohibit, again in a single statute, discrimination on the
basis of disability, veteran status, and various other factors that are addressed
in distinct federal laws, as well as additional factors, such as sexual
orientation or marital status that are not addressed in federal law at all.339
As a general matter, most states borrow liberally from federal
interpretations of employment discrimination law when interpreting their
own statutes.340 In cases brought in federal court that include both federal
and state claims, it is quite common for courts to analyze the claims in detail
under federal law utilizing precedents interpreting those laws and then
declare in a single sentence that state law claims are resolved identically.341
This is not to say that there cannot be significant differences between the two
bodies of law; for example, especially prior to the recent amendments to the
ADA, state protections against disability discrimination were sometimes far

338. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12920 (West Supp. 2012) (“It is hereby declared as the
public policy of this state that it is necessary to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all
persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of
race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical
condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age,
or sexual orientation.”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2012) (“It shall be an unlawful
discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of an individual’s age,
race, creed, color, national origin, sexual orientation, military status, sex, disability, predisposing
genetic characteristics, marital status, or domestic violence victim status, to refuse to hire or employ
or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual
in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.”); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.006(2) (2009) (“The opportunity to obtain employment or housing or to use and enjoy
places of public accommodation without unlawful discrimination because of race, color, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, age or disability hereby is recognized as and
declared to be a civil right.”).
339. See supra note 338.
340. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 76:9 n.45 (7th ed. 2011) (listing state court cases which refer to federal case law
in interpreting state antidiscrimination statutes); see also, e.g., AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d
588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (“By adopting the [Texas Commission on Human Rights Act], the [Texas]
Legislature intended to correlate state law with federal law in employment discrimination cases . . . .
Therefore, we look to federal law to interpret the Act’s provisions.” (quotations and citations
omitted)).
341. See, e.g., Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“As an initial
matter, the court notes that analysis of claims of discrimination under [New York State law and
New York City law] proceeds under the same analytical framework as Title VII claims. . . .
Therefore, the following discussion of plaintiff’s Title VII claims applies equally to his state and
local law claims.” (citation omitted)).
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more robust than the ADA.342 Even when the substantive standards are similar or identical, it can be quite important to the parties how claims under state
or local statutes are resolved, because the remedial provisions of some state
or local statutes are more generous than those under federal law.343
Interpretation of mixed-motive claims under state statutes was messy
even before Gross. Because many state statutes had not been amended after
the 1991 CRA, some courts applying state law have applied Price
Waterhouse to claims of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or
national origin rather than the motivating-factor test and the remedies
limitation of the 1991 CRA.344 Others have applied the 1991 CRA standard,
often without separate discussion.345 Gross adds another layer of uncertainty.
In a case decided after Gross, the Supreme Court of Alaska recently
permitted mixed-motive claims on the basis of age, even though none of its
prior decisions had done so explicitly.346 The defendant argued Gross should
apply.347 The court disagreed. It acknowledged that it “look[ed] to federal
discrimination law jurisprudence generally” but reasoned that the Supreme
Court’s analysis in Gross relied on distinctions between the ADEA and
Title VII that did not exist in Alaskan law and that applying Gross would
“result in a different analytical framework for age discrimination claims than
for other discrimination claims . . . prohibited by the same sentence in the
same statute.”348

342. See Claudia Center & Andrew J. Imparato, Redefining “Disability” Discrimination: A
Proposal to Restore Civil Rights Protections for All Workers, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 334–
35 (2003) (stating that although the vast majority of states had adopted antidiscrimination laws that
tracked the ADA, several states rejected federal case law that narrowed the scope of qualifying
disabilities and instead interpreted their identically worded state statutes to provide broader
protections). For a specific instance of a state court interpreting a state statute to provide more
robust protections than federal law, see State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d
695, 698 (N.Y. 1985).
343. For example, the New York Human Rights Law permits uncapped punitive damages. See
Greenbaum v. Handelsbanken, 67 F. Supp. 2d 228, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that a state law
capping damages awards did not apply to punitive damages). Title VII, by contrast, caps such
damages on a sliding scale (based on the size of the defendant) that ranges from $50,000 to
$300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2006).
344. See, e.g., Harrison v. Olde Fin. Corp., 572 N.W.2d 679, 684 n.15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that because Michigan’s Civil Rights Act was patterned after the 1964 federal Civil Rights
Act, the 1991 amendments to Title VII overriding Price Waterhouse did not affect the court’s
reasoning).
345. See, e.g., Ames, 193 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (stating, in a case applying Title VII’s mixedmotive framework, that “analysis of claims of discrimination under the New York State Human
Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law proceeds under the same analytical
framework as Title VII claims”); see also Mittl v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 794 N.E.2d
660, 662 (N.Y. 2003) (“The standards for establishing unlawful discrimination under [New York
law] are the same as those governing title VII cases under the Federal Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . .”).
346. Smith v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 240 P.3d 834, 842 (Alaska 2010).
347. Id.
348. Id.
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Similar reasoning has been applied (primarily by federal courts) to
permit, notwithstanding Gross, mixed-motive claims of discrimination on the
basis of age under state statutes in (at least) Michigan,349 Missouri,350 Iowa,351
Puerto Rico,352 and Massachusetts.353 By contrast, the Second Circuit
flagged the issue and assumed, without deciding, that Gross would apply to
claims under the New York Human Rights Law.354 There are also numerous
cases post-Gross that simply state, without more analysis, that state law
follows federal ADEA law;355 it is unclear whether these decisions are
deciding that mixed-motive claims are not available at all or are arising in
cases in which pretext analysis would be applicable anyway. This issue
arose on remand after the Supreme Court decision in Gross itself. The
Eighth Circuit permitted Jack Gross’s mixed-motive claim to advance under
the Iowa Civil Rights Act.356
C. The Problem with Potential Congressional Responses to the Hydra
Problem
Shortly after Gross was decided, Congress began considering bills to
override it and restore the possibility of mixed-motive claims under the

349. See Schmitz v. Village of Breckenridge, No. 08-14599-BC, 2009 WL 3273255, at *11–13
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2009) (concluding that Gross did not apply to age discrimination claims under
state law because the distinctions between the ADEA and Title VII were not present in the
Michigan statute).
350. See Baker v. Silver Oak Senior Living Mgmt. Co., 581 F.3d 684, 689–90 (8th Cir. 2009)
(stating that the Missouri Human Rights Act “is less demanding than the ADEA” as interpreted in
Gross and requires only a showing that “age was a contributing factor in the [employer’s]
termination decision” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
351. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 588 F.3d 614, 617–21 (8th Cir. 2009) (allowing the
plaintiff’s mixed-motive age-discrimination claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act to go to a jury).
352. See Vélez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 452 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining
that plaintiff’s burden to establish age discrimination under Puerto Rican law was “lighter” than
under the ADEA as interpreted in Gross and that plaintiff’s prima facie case shifts a burden of
persuasion to the defendant to prove that the challenged action “was not motivated by
discriminatory age animus” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
353. See Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 339 n.15 (D. Mass. 2011)
(suggesting that a mixed-motive jury instruction could be appropriate for an age discrimination
claim under Massachusetts law even while recognizing that “[m]ixed-motive instructions are no
longer appropriate under the ADEA after Gross”).
354. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 105 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010).
355. See, e.g., Holt v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 4:09CV00818 JLH, 2010 WL 3614135, at *3
& n.5 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 8, 2010) (stating that claims under Arkansas law are analyzed using the same
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework as are ADEA claims); Puckett v. McPhillips
Shinbaum, No. 2:06-CV-1148-ID, 2010 WL 1729104, at *5 & n.3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2010)
(delivering a recommendation from the magistrate judge to the district court that the plaintiff’s
success or failure under the ADEA also determines the outcome of the plaintiff’s state claims);
Horan v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 3:07cv1582 (WWE), 2009 WL 3820654, at *1 n.1 (D. Conn.
Sept. 28, 2009) (stating that Connecticut courts look to ADEA precedent in analyzing claims under
the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act).
356. Gross, 588 F.3d at 617, 621.
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ADEA and other non-Title VII statutes.357 When introduced in 2009, it was
expected that these bills might pass relatively easily,358 but ultimately they
failed to progress after hearings were held.359 There is far less likelihood that
the more conservative 112th Congress will pass comparable legislation.
Nonetheless, close examination of the bills is warranted to illustrate how the
broad reach of the Court’s reasoning in Gross caused Congress to at least
consider enacting bills with a similarly unmoored approach. The bills were
substantively identical; for convenience, I will quote from the House bill in
the discussion that follows.
The findings in the bill explicitly repudiate the Court’s reasoning in
Gross:
Congress has relied on a long line of court cases holding that
language in the [ADEA], and similar antidiscrimination and
antiretaliation laws, that is nearly identical to language in title VII . . .
would be interpreted consistently with judicial interpretations of
title VII . . . including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. The Supreme Court’s decision in [Gross] . . . has eroded this
long-held understanding of consistent interpretation and circumvented
well-established precedents.360
This statement of Congress’s reliance and expectations not only differs from
the approach taken by the majority in Gross; it also differs from the approach
taken by the dissenters in Gross, who would have applied Price Waterhouse,
rather than the 1991 CRA’s standards.361 Instead, the bill asserts that
Congress expected precisely what was stated in the committee report that
accompanied the 1991 CRA: the override of Price Waterhouse would govern
the interpretation of related statutes.362
The bill states its purpose as ensuring the standard for proving disparate
treatment is “no different” under the ADEA than under Title VII as amended
by the 1991 CRA, and it would amend the ADEA to insert motivating-factor
357. For the proposed law, which was introduced in substantively identical form in both
chambers of Congress, see Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) and Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
358. See Judy Greenwald, Age-Bias Bill Would Ease Burden for Plaintiffs, BUS. INS. (Oct. 18,
2009), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091018/ISSUE01/310189980 (“Legislation that
seeks to make it easier for employees to prevail in age discrimination cases looks likely to win
approval, observers say.”).
359. Jacqueline Go, Comment, Another Move Away From Title VII: Why Gross Got It Right, 51
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1025, 1027 n.18 (2011).
360. H.R. 3721 § 2(a)(3).
361. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2356 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating
that rejecting the 1991 CRA’s standard was “reasonabl[e]” but that the Court should have
“adhere[d] to [Price Waterhouse’s] motivating-factor test”).
362. See supra text accompanying note 138. Of course, it is impossible to know definitively
whether the committee report that accompanied the 1991 CRA was a correct statement of that
Congress’s legislative intent. Justice Scalia and others would be quick to point out that a statement
in a committee report has not garnered a majority vote in both houses.
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language as well as a limitation on remedies that is almost identical to the
changes in Title VII made by the 1991 CRA.363 But it would actually go
beyond existing Title VII law to respond to interpretative questions that have
arisen since 1991. First, it would amend the text of the ADEA to state
explicitly that a plaintiff may rely on “any type or form of admissible
circumstantial or direct evidence.”364 This would codify the holding of
Desert Palace. Second, it would add language—language that lacks a
specific textual analogue in Title VII—indicating that a plaintiff may also
succeed by showing that “the practice complained of would not have
occurred in the absence of an impermissible factor.”365 This language would
codify the but-for standard that typically governs pretext cases. And third,
probably most importantly, it would address the ongoing confusion regarding
when and how courts determine whether to issue a mixed-motive instruction
by providing explicitly that “[e]very method for proving either such
violation” (that is, either a motivating-factor test or but-for causation) “shall
be available to the plaintiff.”366
Amending only the ADEA with this language would invite a new hydra
problem: courts, following the reasoning in Gross, might continue to apply
the but-for causation standard announced in Gross to other statutes or choose
to adopt yet a different causation standard. The bill, not surprisingly, seeks
to avoid this. The bill goes far beyond simply a statement in a committee
report, or even statutory language setting forth congressional findings and
purposes, regarding expectations about how courts would interpret
Congress’s actions. Instead, the bill’s substantive language provides that the
causation standard it announces would apply to:
(A) this Act [the ADEA], including subsection (d) [concerning
retaliation];
(B) any Federal law forbidding employment discrimination;
(C) any law forbidding discrimination of the type described in
subsection (d) [concerning retaliation] or forbidding other retaliation
against an individual for engaging in, or interference with, any
federally protected activity including the exercise of any right
established by Federal law (including a whistleblower law); or
(D) any provision of the Constitution that protects against
discrimination or retaliation.367
The breadth of these provisions is striking. The bill seeks to avoid the hydra
problem—and the challenge of identifying which particular statutes Gross
might be applied to—by reaching (almost) any and all statutes that it ever

363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

H.R. 3721 §§ 2(b), 3.
Id. § 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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might affect. The bill does, however, provide an exception for retaliation
claims to the extent that any particular law has “an express provision
regarding the legal burdens of proof applicable to that claim.”368
Given the Court’s refusal in Gross to consider amendments to Title VII
to hold any relevance to the interpretation of the ADEA, the “blanket
amendment” approach is a reasonable response on the part of Congress. The
number of different laws to which Gross has already been applied (e.g.,
Title VII’s retaliation provisions, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, ERISA,
the Juror Act, the FMLA, § 1981, § 1983 First Amendment retaliation
claims369) makes clear that it would be quite onerous for Congress to
separately amend each of these statutes to end reliance on Gross. This is
particularly true because every law has champions and opponents, and there
can be large political obstacles to opening up a given statute to amendment.
While enactment of the Gross override bill would be equivalent to amending
these other statutes, it might not trigger the same political concerns because
its effects would be far less obvious. It also might be referred only to the
committees with jurisdiction over the ADEA, rather than the far larger group
of committees with jurisdiction over any of the relevant statutes
implicated.370 Moreover, even if Congress separately amended all of the
statutes to which Gross has already been applied, Gross could still be applied
to statutes in other contexts that Congress had not considered.371
But to say that a blanket amendment is a reasonable response to Gross
is not to say that it is ideal. Far from it. If this bill were enacted as written, it
would mean that language codified with the substantive provisions of the
ADEA would govern the standard of proof applied in statutes scattered
across the Code. This would include not only employment discrimination
statutes but also any other federal statute that addresses retaliation in any
context. There would be no indication in the codification of those other statutes that causation was governed by language found in the codification of the
ADEA. (The bill protects plaintiffs who might be unaware of these provisions at the outset of a lawsuit by stating explicitly that “the plaintiff need not

368. Id.
369. See supra subpart V(A).
370. This relates to a notice problem discussed more fully below. See infra note 372 and
accompanying text.
371. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, overrode
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), a decision regarding the statute of
limitations in Title VII cases alleging pay discrimination. In that statute, Congress addressed the
hydra problem in a more modest fashion: it explicitly amended the text of Title VII, the ADEA, the
ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act, the acts where the issue might be expected to arise most
frequently. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 §§ 3–5. This was insufficient to end reliance on
Ledbetter as a shadow precedent. In a recent case arising under the FMLA, the district court held
Ledbetter controlling because Congress had not amended the FMLA when it amended these other
statutes. Maher v. Int’l Paper Co., 600 F. Supp. 2d 940, 950 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
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plead the existence of this subsection.”)372 Indeed, although its stated
purpose is to make interpretation of the ADEA “no different than the
standard” under Title VII,373 the bill, if enacted, would by its terms supersede
the language in Title VII itself. Title VII would no longer be governed by its
own motivating-factor language; it would be governed by the new language
in the ADEA. Courts would then need to determine whether the precedents
interpreting these provisions in Title VII would have relevance to the
Title VII-derived provisions of the ADEA, which would by their terms circle
back to apply to Title VII.
Beyond mere notice problems, the blanket amendment approach would
create difficult situations where the standards it imposes conflict with
preexisting substantive provisions of law. The statute creates an exception
for retaliation claims that explicitly include a different standard of proof,374
but it has no analogous exception for substantive employment discrimination
claims. This would likely create confusion and conflicts (that would need to
be resolved by the courts) in statutes that do have explicit conflicting
language. For example, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination
“solely by reason of” disability.375 This language reasonably has been
interpreted (long prior to Gross) to prohibit mixed-motive claims.376 If the
proposed bill were enacted, a provision buried in the ADEA would supersede
the clear language of the Rehabilitation Act and a significant body of
precedent interpreting that language.377
At the same time, notwithstanding the striking breadth of this draft
language (and the notice and substantive conflict problems it engenders), the
bill would still be insufficient to end entirely the hydra problem. Courts
interpreting antidiscrimination mandates in other areas of statutory law—e.g.,
372. H.R. 3721 § 3. Obviously, Congress could identify all relevant provisions and indicate
that they should be amended separately, but this draft bill does not do so, and any attempt to do so
would lose the advantages that the blanket amendment provides in terms of not forcing Congress to
attempt to identify all relevant laws to which Gross might be applied and muster the political will to
amend them all.
373. Id. § 2(b).
374. Id. § 3.
375. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
376. See Davenport v. Idaho Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, No. CV 05-054-E-LMB, 2008 WL
5061678, at *1–2 (D. Idaho May 20, 2008) (applying Ninth Circuit precedent to conclude that
because of the use of the phrase “‘solely by reason of,’ . . . a mixed motive analysis is not
appropriate when applying the Rehabilitation Act”); see also Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The elimination of the word ‘solely’ from the causation
provision of the ADA suggests forcefully that Congress intended the statute to reach beyond the
Rehabilitation Act to cover situations in which discrimination on the basis of disability is one factor,
but not the only factor, motivating an adverse employment action.”).
377. On the other hand, a general rule of statutory interpretation governs against repeals or
modifications of statutes by implication. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)
(holding that in the absence of expressed intent to repeal, repeal by implication is only appropriate
when there is an irreconcilable difference between earlier and later statutes). It is thus possible that
courts would apply this canon and refuse to enforce the causation standard announced in the Gross
override if language in other statutes was clearly inconsistent.
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housing or education—frequently look to Title VII case law because the language of these other acts largely parallels that of Title VII and there is
dramatically more case law under Title VII than these other laws.378 The
Gross override would not reach these laws. Courts might reinterpret the
“because of” language of these other statutes consistently with the amended
ADEA-now-superseding-Title VII standard, but they could also apply
Gross’s reasoning and refuse to do so. Nor would this language (or any
congressional directive) address the hydra problem as it plays out in the state
courts, although enforcing a uniform federal standard would avoid the
particular challenge now faced in the interpretation of state laws that prohibit
age discrimination in the same sentence as they do race, sex, religion, or
national-origin discrimination. Additionally, despite language that purports
to reach interpretation of constitutional claims, it is not clear whether
Congress would have the power to dictate a causation standard to the courts
in that context. Congress is the ultimate arbiter of statutory law, but the
courts decide the meaning of constitutional law.
In sum, in light of Gross, the blanket-amendment approach of these bills
is a reasonable, and maybe the best, way for Congress to supersede Gross
without creating (much of) a new hydra problem. But there are real
disadvantages to forcing Congress to take such action to end reliance on a
disfavored interpretation. It is also quite possible that some combination of
these concerns would mean that Congress—even if it ultimately enacts a
Gross override—would pass a bill that did not include language applying the
amendments to all other employment discrimination and retaliation statutes.
Courts would then likely continue to rely on Gross as a shadow precedent in
interpreting other employment discrimination or retaliation statutes, despite
Congress’s clear repudiation of the but-for standard as applied to the ADEA
and its equally clear previous repudiation of that standard as applied to
Title VII.
Further, assume for a moment that Congress does not muster the
political will to pass the proposed Gross override bills. For reasons I discuss
in Part VI, I do not think that this would necessarily indicate that Congress
agrees with the Court’s interpretation in Gross or the application of the
standard announced in Gross to other statutes, but rather that the test imposed
by the Court is unreasonable. If this is correct, Congress also faces
something close to a catch-22 with respect to any future legislation. Gross
establishes clear Supreme Court precedent that in the ADEA, and arguably in
all other employment discrimination statutes, “because of”—in the absence
of explicit motivating-factor language—means but-for causation.
If
378. See, e.g., Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 744–45 (2d Cir. 2003) (borrowing
from Title VII “hostile environment” case law to determine whether plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence to support a claim under § 1983 regarding harassment in the education context);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1988) (drawing
upon the parallel between Title VII and the Fair Housing Act and holding that because Title VII
does not require a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent, neither does the Fair Housing Act).
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Congress were to enact a new employment discrimination statute (e.g., the
proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act, which would prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity379), and if
it wanted to permit mixed-motive claims, it certainly would be wise to
include motivating-factor language like that found in Title VII.380 A choice
to do so, however, could be deemed by courts as further confirmation that
Congress intends statutes that lack such language (e.g., the ADA, § 1981,
GINA) to be interpreted differently. On the other hand, a failure on
Congress’s part to include explicit motivating-factor language in any postGross employment discrimination statute would almost certainly be
interpreted by courts as a conscious choice to preclude mixed-motive claims.
VI. Realizing Congress’s Role in Creating Statutory Meaning
The foundational premise of legislative supremacy grants Congress the
ultimate authority to shape statutory law, as expressed by Congress’s
unquestioned prerogative to supersede judicial interpretations of statutes with
which it disagrees by enacting overrides.381 This power stands in sharp
contrast to constitutional adjudication, where the courts have final authority
to declare the meaning of constitutional principles and thus can strike down
statutes as unconstitutional.382 But the anomaly of statutory interpretation is
that, at least in the federal system, courts, though ostensibly serving as
“agents” of Congress in this context, set the rules by which the
congressional–judicial conversation is conducted.383 Thus, for the promise of
legislative supremacy to be realized, the rules developed by courts—that is,
the conventions of statutory interpretation—must themselves respect the
separation of powers and Congress’s authority to create statutory meaning.
379. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2011, S. 811, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1397, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).
380. I credit Jamie Prenkert for this point.
381. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J.
281, 281–82 (1989) (arguing that the principle of legislative supremacy precludes judicial policy
making when statutory directives are clear).
382. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
383. I thank Peter Strauss for making this observation. Many state legislatures have enacted
rules that seek to govern statutory interpretation by courts, typically codifying some, but not all,
standard canons of statutory interpretation. See generally Scott, supra note 22, at 343–44 (2010).
Commentators disagree regarding the extent to which such codes should bind state courts and about
the constitutionality of comparable directives by Congress to the federal courts. Compare id. at 344
(arguing that state courts should follow state legislative directives), and Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2140, 2143–47
(2002) (arguing that Congress could impose such rules and discussing the benefits of its doing so),
with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules
of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 99–100 (2003) (arguing that Congress does
not have the power to prospectively control judicial interpretation), and Linda D. Jellum, “Which Is
to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of
Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (arguing that many such directives would be
unconstitutional violations of the separation of powers doctrine).
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Numerous conventions of statutory interpretation rely on assertions regarding
Congress and congressional intent that are impossible to verify. In many
instances, this is relatively unproblematic and often serves to promote
predictability, efficiency, and fairness. But when the fictions of statutory
interpretation make assumptions about what Congress does—and what
Congress may reasonably be expected to do—that clearly fail to accord with
reality, they may work to undermine legislative supremacy. I contend that
the interpretive principle announced by the Court in Gross falls into this
category. It also has created widespread confusion among lower courts and
resulted in similar cases being treated quite differently without any affirmative indication by Congress that it intends these differences. I propose an
alternative approach that can better permit overrides to play their expected
role in securing the separation of powers and that also advances independent
interests in the fair, predictable, and efficient interpretation of statutes.
A. The Fictions of Statutory Interpretation as Applied to Overrides
In Gross, the Court placed great significance on a difference between
Title VII and the ADEA: Title VII, subsequent to the 1991 CRA, includes
language stating explicitly that an unlawful act is established by showing that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is a “motivating factor” in an
employment decision, while the ADEA lacks this language.384 The Court
does not merely note these differences. It states that they must be understood
to mean that Congress “cho[se]” to have the identical “because of” language
in the statutes interpreted differently.385 This claim rests on unverified, and
largely unverifiable, assumptions by the Court about what Congress “meant”
by its prior actions and what Congress could or should do in the future if this
was not in fact what Congress meant. The fact that these assumptions
resulted in the Court adopting a causation standard for the ADEA—and its
quickly being applied to numerous other statutes—that Congress had clearly
repudiated for Title VII should at least make one pause to consider whether
these assumptions are warranted. I contend they are not.
I am not claiming that I (or anyone else) know definitively what
causation standard the 1964 Congress that enacted Title VII, or the 1967
Congress that enacted the ADEA, intended for mixed-motive claims. I think
it is probably accurate to say that neither Congress had a specific intent
regarding this particular issue.386 Nor am I claiming to know definitively that

384. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009) (rejecting the petitioner’s
argument that decisions construing Title VII should control the Court’s decision on the ground that
“Title VII is materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion”).
385. Id. at 2349, 2350 & n.3.
386. As a threshold matter, some would take issue with the basic premise that Congress, a
collection of 535 voting members with individual objectives and agendas, can have any unified
intent at all. Others argue, I think convincingly, that one can nonetheless ascribe “group intent” to
Congress. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR
INTERPRETATION 82–83 (2010) (arguing in favor of attributing group intent to Congress because
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the 1991 Congress intended the causation under the ADEA to be interpreted
consistently with the motivating-factor standard it explicitly adopted for
Title VII. As demonstrated in subpart III(D) above, I think that consideration
of the 1991 CRA as a whole, as well as the explicit statement in the
committee report that the committee expected the motivating-factor standard
to be applied to statutes similar to Title VII,387 provides compelling support
for this inference. And Part V demonstrates that it would be quite onerous
for Congress to identify and amend all statutes that use causation language
similar to Title VII.
But whether or not one agrees with my analysis regarding legislative
intent and the potential barriers to the congressional action that the Gross
Court expects, it should be obvious that Congress did not affirmatively indicate in statutory language (or in any other way) that it did not intend the
causation standard under the ADEA to be the same as that of Title VII. At
most, one can draw a negative inference from Congress’s “neglect[ing]” to
amend the ADEA and all other potentially applicable statutes when it
amended Title VII.388 It is also essential to recognize the Court in Gross does
not categorically refuse to consider legislative intent. Although the Court
asserts that it simply interprets the “ordinary meaning” of the text, it justifies
its failure to apply either Price Waterhouse or the standard endorsed by the
1991 CRA on the explicit ground that the Court “must give effect to
Congress’ choice.”389 Moreover, since, as discussed in Parts III and IV,
either “but for” or “motivating factor” is a plausible interpretation of
“because of,” plain meaning analysis does not provide a definitive resolution.
A key issue in the case, therefore, is how the Court determines congressional
intent. The Gross majority ignores a clear statement in the committee report
(generally considered the most reliable source of legislative history390) that is
directly on point in favor of a negative inference derived from Congress’s

“we routinely attribute intent to a group of people based on the intent of a subset of that group,
provided that there is agreement in advance about what role the subgroup will play”); Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 864–65
(1992) (reviewing critiques of ascribing group intent to Congress but concluding that while “[a]ll
this is to say that ascribing purposes to groups and institutions is a complex business, and one that is
often difficult to describe abstractly[,] . . . that fact does not make such ascriptions improper”).
387. See supra text accompanying note 138.
388. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
389. Id. at 2350 & n.3 (citation omitted).
390. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 171 (2009) (referring to committee reports as “a relatively reliable indicator of
legislative intent” as compared with sponsor statements and other sources of legislative history);
ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 222 fig.7.1 (depicting committee reports as the “most authoritative” in
the hierarchy of legislative-history sources used by the Supreme Court); see also George A.
Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of
Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39,
43 (“Committee reports are well-regarded because, in the words of Justice Harlan, they represent
the ‘considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation.’” (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969))).
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inaction. It is accordingly appropriate to probe the validity of this inference,
just as courts and commentators have long probed the validity of legislative
history as a source from which to infer congressional intent.391
As discussed in subpart II(B), courts typically assume that identical or
similar language in “related” statutes should be interpreted consistently, and
accordingly, courts borrow authoritative interpretations of one statute when
interpreting another. Courts offer a variety of intent, purpose-based, and
textual justifications for this practice. In the discussion above, I suggested
that even if not grounded in a verifiable congressional intent, consistent
interpretation of identical or similar language in statutes in pari materia will
often be justified by other rationales that undergird statutory interpretation.392
Moreover—and of crucial importance—in the absence of a reaction by
Congress to a given judicial interpretation, there are rarely grounds to
question the underlying premise that the Court’s interpretation determines
what the relevant language in the primary statute means. And interpreting
related statutes consistently has the separate virtue of making statutory law
develop in a relatively uniform manner, thus promoting efficiency,
predictability, and fairness.
Subpart II(B) described the inference that variation among otherwise
similar statutes is “meaningful” as the converse of interpreting statutes in
pari materia consistently. As discussed in subpart I(B), in contrast to application of the in pari materia canon, the application of the meaningfulvariation canon of interpretation does little to promote fairness, efficiency, or
predictability. Accordingly, application of this canon is primarily justified
by inferences based on assumptions about congressional intent. In decisions
prior to Gross, the Court has emphasized that context can be important in
assessing whether this inference reflects actual purposive action by
Congress; for example, the Court has stated that the inference is at its
strongest when applied to “contrasting statutory sections originally enacted
simultaneously in relevant respects.”393
Even in this situation, the
assumption is more likely to be valid when applied to a bill that addresses a
single subject and progresses in an orderly fashion through the committee
process. By contrast, “variation” in sections that are enacted simultaneously
may be more likely to be inadvertent when the sections are part of an
omnibus bill that addresses multiple subjects, or when there are significant
amendments made on the House or Senate floor or in conference
committee.394 Some might argue, however, that even if this rule sometimes
391. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 990 n.j (collecting scholarly commentary debating
the reliability of legislative history as a means of inferring congressional intent).
392. See supra subpart II(B).
393. Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75 (1995) (emphasis added).
394. Cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 329 (1997) (observing that where provisions “evolve[]
separately in the congressional process, only to be passed together at the last minute,” there is a risk
that, “in the rough-and-tumble,” no one considers the significance of differences between the texts
of the different provisions passed).
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is applied in the absence of true congressional intent, it can help “discipline”
Congress into taking greater care in drafting.395 This is at least plausible, in
that it is not clearly beyond the capability of congressional drafters to read
carefully a bill before enactment and consider whether variation of otherwise
similar provisions is meaningful. Although undoubtedly some mistakes
would slip through, consistent application of this canon to provisions enacted
simultaneously might result in greater care and clarity in drafting, a significant benefit that could outweigh the possibility that it would sometimes be
applied when the inference is unwarranted.
But as applied to overrides, the inference of a meaningful variation is
far more attenuated—and I assert that it will often operate to undermine
actual congressional intent. This is true for two primary reasons. First, the
so-called meaningful variation is not the result of independent drafting
decisions made by Congress; rather, it is a response to a judicial
interpretation with which Congress disagreed. Often (as Part IV demonstrated was true in the case of Congress’s response to Price Waterhouse) the
preexisting language of a statute could reasonably be interpreted consistently
with the meaning Congress endorses in an override. If this is the case, the
preexisting language of other similar statutes can also reasonably be
interpreted to bear the meaning that Congress endorses in the override. If,
rather than enacting an override, Congress was expected to signal its
disagreement with a judicial interpretation by issuing a special committee
report396 or enacting a joint resolution397—and if courts consistently
respected such signals and overruled their prior precedents accordingly—
then Congress could effectively supersede a judicial interpretation without
creating variation in statutory language among otherwise similar statutes.
But instead, Congress is expected to signal disagreement with prior judicial

395. See Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 636 (1995) (describing canons that Schacter characterizes as
“disciplinarian” as justified by a belief that “politics easily runs amok, and the court must
‘discipline’ the political process through deliberately crafted interpretive rules” and observing that
“[t]he principal form of discipline is narrow, text-based interpretation that limits the reach of
legislation by requiring exacting specificity in statutory language”).
396. I am not suggesting that this would be an ideal approach. It would be quite hard to
determine whether such a report represented the interests of a true majority of Congress. See
generally James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing risks posed by reliance
upon post-enactment legislative history, although ultimately arguing that it should be considered at
times and proposing factors that courts should consider when assessing its reliability).
397. A joint resolution, unlike a committee report, is passed by both houses of Congress and
signed by the President, thereby eliminating concerns that it did not represent the desires of a true
majority of Congress or satisfy the Constitution’s bicameralism and presentment requirements. See
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every . . . Resolution . . . to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the President of the United
States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him . . . .”).
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interpretations by substantively amending statutory text.398 This creates a
variation among otherwise similar statutes, but it is quite different from
distinctions made by Congress within a statute when initially enacted. And,
at least at the time when Congress passed the 1991 CRA, there was little
reason for Congress to assume that courts would interpret a failure to amend
all potentially related statutes as a “choice” to endorse a different
interpretation.
Second, as Part V demonstrated, there are significant barriers to
expecting Congress to identify and then amend the uncertain and unspecified
group of statutes to which a disfavored interpretation might be applied.
Courts and commentators have long questioned the validity of inferring
congressional approval of prior judicial interpretations from congressional
inaction because it is quite difficult to enact legislation and because Congress
must juggle many competing priorities.399 In this context, likewise, the rules
of interpretation adopted by courts should be cognizant of the institutional
realities of Congress. It makes no sense to infer purpose to congressional
inaction when the expected action would be prohibitively difficult.
Moreover, as demonstrated in Part V, the kind of blanket amendment
override that the Gross rule invites would cause its own problems.
Accordingly, as described more fully in the next subpart, I conclude that a
variation among otherwise-similar statutes that is the result of a
congressional override of a prior judicial interpretation generally should not
be presumed to be “meaningful”; in other words, such variation generally
should not be read as signaling congressional intent that the preexisting
language common to both statutes bear different interpretations.
Note too that the interpretive approach adopted by Gross causes similar
problems if Congress codifies, rather than overrides, a judicial interpretation.
Codification is relatively common, permitting Congress to signal its approval
of a judicial opinion and thus solidify the outcome, expand the reasoning to
applications not addressed by the Court, or incorporate the interpretation into

398. Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 275, 285 (1972) (holding that Congress’s failure to enact
an override of prior judicial opinions excluding professional baseball from antitrust regulation
should be understood as approval of those prior decisions).
399. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496 (1997) (“[W]e have frequently
cautioned that it is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a
controlling rule of law.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Transp.
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s reasoning
that because Congress had not amended Title VII to override a prior Court decision interpreting
Title VII to permit affirmative action, the Court could assume that its prior interpretation was
correct and stating that “congressional inaction is a canard”); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185
n.21 (1969) (“Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or
paralysis.”); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942) (“The search for
significance in the silence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage.”); Eskridge, supra note
23, at 94 (citing formalist, realist, and systemic problems with inferring legislative intent from
legislative inaction and concluding that “legislative inaction rarely tells us much about relevant
legislative intent”).
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a larger law reform.400 In this context as well, if Congress only amended the
statute actually interpreted by the courts—even if only to emphasize its
agreement with the prior judicial interpretation—it would create a variation
among otherwise similar statutes. The reasoning announced in Gross would
interpret this as granting courts license to depart from an interpretation
endorsed both by prior judicial opinions and by Congress. In fact, recall that
Congress’s response to Price Waterhouse in the 1991 CRA could be characterized as largely codifying the interpretation of Title VII endorsed by five
Justices in that case, in that it adopted the same “motivating factor” standard
and simply replaced the affirmative defense on liability with a limitation on
remedies.401 This illustrates a different reason for codification: Price
Waterhouse was a splintered decision and it was unclear whether Justice
White’s or Justice O’Connor’s concurrence should be deemed to provide the
holding of the case. Thus, the 1991 CRA’s response to Price Waterhouse
could be characterized as a statement that the Price Waterhouse Court
interpreted the meaning of “because of,” the preexisting language shared by
Title VII and the ADEA, almost, but not precisely, right. Despite this
endorsement, the Court in Gross deems Congress’s failure to amend the
ADEA grounds to interpret “because of” in the ADEA quite differently.402
At root, the interpretive questions posed by overrides call into question
the separate interpretive fiction, implicit in the judicial hierarchy, that a
declaration by the Supreme Court is an “authoritative statement of what [a]
statute mean[s] before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to
that construction.”403 Citing this principle, the Supreme Court has reasoned
that even a decision by the Court that is counter to the unanimous interpretations of the courts of appeals does not “change[]” the law but rather “finally
decide[s]” what it has “always meant and explain[s] why the Courts of
Appeals had misinterpreted the will of the enacting Congress.”404 With
respect to lower federal courts, this premise is necessary to permit precedent
to function effectively. But when Congress intervenes to supersede the prior
judicial interpretation, it raises the question of whether the prior judicial
interpretation really should be an “authoritative statement” of what a statute

400. See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt et al., Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional
Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1354, 1386–87
(2007) (discussing an empirical study finding that Congress codified 7% of Supreme Court tax
cases and exploring reasons for codification).
401. See supra text accompanying notes 133–34. As noted above, this was deemed quite
significant by the dissenters in Gross, who characterized Congress’s actions as “ratif[ying] Price
Waterhouse’s [motivating-factor test].” Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2355 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
text accompanying note 191.
402. My thanks to Jamie Prenkert for helping me articulate this point.
403. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994) (emphasis added).
404. Id. at 313 n.12. This discussion arose in the context of the retroactivity of overrides. See
Widiss, supra note 12, at 534–36 (summarizing and discussing the Court’s reasoning in Rivers,
which held that, generally, a substantive override of an interpretation of a civil rights statute would
not be applied retroactively).
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means. The overriding Congress does not necessarily know the will of the
enacting Congress—but neither does the Court. The interpretive proposal
that I endorse suggests that, on balance, given this uncertainty, the recognition that statutory text can often bear multiple plausible interpretations, the
barriers to amending multiple statutes, and the problems with enacting a
blanket override, it is better to privilege congressional signals over judicial
signals—a position I develop in the next subpart.
B. Better Respecting the Institutional Capabilities of Courts and Congress
Gross shows how application of standard principles of statutory
interpretation and standard rules of precedent to the interpretation of
overrides means that congressional amendment of a single statute—the statute actually interpreted in a given case—can be understood as a license to
depart both from the prior precedent and from the meaning Congress
ascribes. By contrast, a judicial interpretation of a single statute, such as
Gross’s interpretation of the ADEA, is readily applied by lower courts to
numerous other statutes. This aggrandizes the judicial role relative to the
congressional role in ascribing meaning to statutory text and turns the
premise of legislative supremacy on its head. In prior work, I advocated that
courts adopt a rebuttable presumption that overrides require “fresh” statutory
interpretation of preexisting language rather than ongoing reliance on the
shadow precedent.405 In light of Gross—in which the Court engaged in fresh
interpretation as if on a blank slate and with a strong presumption against
adopting the preferred interpretation signaled by Congress—I realize that my
proposal needs to be clarified. The fresh interpretation I argue is warranted
should be consistent with the meaning Congress signaled it ascribes to the
relevant language, so long as the preexisting language can reasonably bear
such meaning. This interpretive rule could be announced by the Supreme
Court, or, potentially, enacted by Congress as a general instruction to govern
the interpretation of overrides and the statutes they amend.406
Under the approach I suggest, enactment of an override that endorses a
plausible interpretation of the preexisting language would function in a
manner similar to a decision by a court higher than the Supreme Court. It
would explain how that language should be interpreted in the context actually
addressed in the override and would create a rebuttable presumption that in
situations “relevantly similar” to the issue addressed head-on in the
override—including statutory provisions that would typically be interpreted

405. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 566 (arguing that “[r]ather than simply relying on Congress
to draft specific overrides ‘more clearly,’ courts interpreting overrides should do so in a manner that
is more respectful of the significance of a congressional override” and proposing that the courts
adopt a rebuttable presumption that overrides require “fresh” statutory analysis of preexisting
language).
406. As discussed above, commentators disagree about whether Congress can constitutionally
direct how courts interpret statutes. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
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consistently under the in pari materia canon—the interpretation suggested by
Congress should likewise apply. In other words, this is the same reasoning a
court would employ if the interpretation at issue were put forth by a superior
court rather than by Congress. Rather than being deemed to create a
meaningful variation between statutes (or within a single statute), the
override would inform the understanding of preexisting language common to
multiple statutes. This would not mean that Congress could not enact
overrides that carve out a narrow rule from a more generally applicable
interpretation or that change the interpretation of one statute but not multiple
statutes. Congress simply would need to enact statutory language that made
this intent clear, perhaps partially codifying the prior interpretation in some
key statutes or enacting a “findings or purposes” clause stating an intent to
change only the interpretation of a single statute. The approach I advocate
would simply shift the inference drawn from legislative “silence” regarding
related statutes from a presumption that Congress “chose” to grant courts
absolute freedom in interpreting such statutes to a presumed preference for
the interpretation endorsed in the override.
Importantly, under the approach I advocate, the statutory language itself
still controls, thus mitigating the risk that application of this rule would
undermine compromises reached through the legislative process. “Because
of” can mean both motivating-factor and but-for causation. The issue in
Gross was simply which of these plausible interpretations should be adopted,
with the added knowledge that in Title VII, a substantively similar statute,
Congress had explicitly stated that proving an illegitimate criterion was a
motivating factor in a decision was sufficient to establish liability. In this
circumstance, I suggest that courts should understand the override as functionally reinterpreting “because of” in Title VII.407 Then, applying the
standard in pari materia canon, courts would naturally interpret “because of”
in related statutes, such as the ADA and the ADEA, to also establish a
motivating-factor standard (unless, as discussed below, other differences
between the statutes, such as the ADEA’s “reasonable factor other than age”
defense, affected this analysis). Courts might reasonably conclude as well
that related statutes that contain similar but not identical words—e.g., “on the
basis of” or “by reason of”—that could also reasonably be interpreted to
establish a motivating-factor standard should likewise be interpreted
consistently.408

407. As noted, Congress added an explicit provision defining the causal standard as “motivating
factor” and a limitation on remedies, but, as established in Part IV, the preexisting language of
Title VII could also easily bear this interpretation.
408. Sometimes courts deem such small differences to be a meaningful variation, while other
times they gloss over differences and instead aver that the language is similar enough that it should
bear a consistent meaning. In the particular example given in the text, courts have generally
interpreted these differences in causation language among employment discrimination statutes to be
insignificant. See supra text accompanying notes 289, 323–24 (discussing how courts have applied
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If, by contrast, the preexisting language of a related statute could not
reasonably bear the meaning signaled by Congress through enactment of an
override, courts would be free (indeed, expected) to consider the significance
of such differences. The Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits discrimination
“solely by reason of” a disability,409 is a good example of this. Even under
the approach I advocate, courts could reasonably interpret this language to
preclude mixed-motive claims; if Congress disagreed, it would be
appropriate to expect Congress to amend the statute explicitly. Moreover,
even if Congress were to amend the Rehabilitation Act to override decisions
interpreting the “solely by reason of” language to preclude mixed-motive
claims, that override would not necessarily call for reinterpretation of any
other statutory provisions that also prohibit actions “solely by reason of” a
given factor because that language cannot reasonably be interpreted to permit
mixed-motive claims. In other words, the rule I am proposing would make a
distinction between overrides (including, I contend, Congress’s partial codification and partial override of Price Waterhouse) that endorse a plausible
interpretation of preexisting language and overrides (such as a potential
modification of the Rehabilitation Act to permit mixed-motive claims) that
correct a prior mistake, update a statute, or choose a substantively different
policy that was not a plausible interpretation of the preexisting language.
Similarly, courts could reasonably consider the significance of statutory
differences entirely unrelated to the override that might have bearing on a
given interpretive question. For example, as discussed above, although
Title VII and the ADEA both prohibit discrimination “because of” specified
factors, the ADEA also explicitly provides that acts based on a “reasonable
factor other than age” are not unlawful;410 Title VII does not include an
analogous provision. Under the rule I propose, courts could assess the
significance of such differences when determining whether “because of” in
the two statutes should bear a consistent meaning; again, this would be the
same analysis that they would naturally undertake if a judicial interpretation,

Gross’s interpretation of “because of” to other statutes prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of”
or “by reason of” the outlawed conduct).
409. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). The Rehabilitation Act and its relationship to other
antidiscrimination statutes provides a good example of the complexity that can arise when applying
the in pari materia canon. Long before Gross, courts struggled to determine whether to interpret
the causation standard under the ADA as consistent with Title VII or with the Rehabilitation Act.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on this question. Most circuits concluded (at least prior to
Gross) that mixed-motive claims were cognizable under the ADA because the operative language of
the relevant provision was drawn from Title VII, but the Sixth and Tenth Circuits followed
Rehabilitation Act precedent to preclude mixed-motive claims under the ADA as well. See Macy v.
Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 357, 363 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing this split). As noted
above, Gross raises new questions regarding the viability of mixed-motive claims under the ADA.
See supra notes 303–10 and accompanying text.
410. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006).
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rather than a congressional amendment, established the motivating-factor
standard in Title VII.411
The outer scope of the rule I propose would flow naturally from the
analysis, admittedly fuzzy at times, that courts currently undertake when
determining whether statutes are similar enough that judicial interpretations
of a given statute’s language should be applied to other statutes.412 In other
words, the Court’s reasoning in Gross relied heavily upon the foundational
premise that the ADEA and Title VII were similar enough that it would have
been natural for Congress to amend them both if it wanted to indicate that a
specific consistent causation standard would govern both. This was a
plausible (although I assert, as discussed above, a deeply flawed) proposition
only because they were already recognized as related statutes that were
typically interpreted consistently. The Court would not have assumed that
Congress would naturally have amended a criminal statute that also included
the words “because of” when it enacted the Price Waterhouse override, and
accordingly, it would have been unlikely to infer any significance from
Congress’s failure to do so. My approach simply suggests that, as applied to
statutes that courts typically deemed to be related, there would be a
rebuttable presumption that Congress’s interpretation of shared language be
applied just as a judicial interpretation of shared language is applied. This
has the significant added benefit of making it more likely that statutes in a
related area will—absent clear statutory language to the contrary—be
interpreted in a relatively consistent manner, increasing predictability,
efficiency, and fairness. But if statutes are too dissimilar to expect that a
judicial interpretation of similar language would be applied, there would be
neither a positive nor negative inference drawn from Congress’s amendment
of one statute when determining the meaning of language found in such other
statutes.
A few additional limitations are important to note. As I explained in
previous work, this rule would only apply to nonconstitutional decisions.413
If a court strikes down a statute on constitutional grounds, its constitutional
analysis is fully binding precedent. The rule would only apply to the aspects
of the precedential case that are related to the issue addressed in the
override.414 Although my approach would preclude reliance on the general
rationales undergirding an interpretation that was overridden, it would permit

411. See supra text accompanying notes 260–61 (discussing the significance of the RFOA
defense in the causation question).
412. See supra subpart II(B).
413. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 569 (limiting the proposed interpretative rule to
nonconstitutional rulings because the courts, not Congress, “have ultimate authority for
constitutional interpretation” and observing that “[t]o the extent that a court either struck down or
narrowly interpreted a statute on constitutional grounds, the court’s constitutional analysis would
continue to be applied”).
414. Id.
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ongoing reliance on other parts of a precedential case unrelated to the
override.
The interpretative regime I suggest would promote the orderly
development of statutory law in a relatively uniform, predictable, and
consistent fashion, not only within the federal system but also between
federal and analogous state statutes.415 Indeed, state courts and federal courts
applying state law have long implicitly adopted the approach I advocate by
interpreting state statutes that are generally similar to analogous federal law
in line with such federal law, even if the state statutes were not themselves
amended to include an override. Thus, for example, it was quite common, at
least prior to Gross, for courts to interpret “because of” in state statutes to
mean that a plaintiff must show that an illegitimate criterion was a
motivating factor in a decision, even if the state language had not been
amended to include the motivating-factor language added to Title VII.416
Given the challenges to amending multiple statutes, discussed in Part V,
I think the approach I advocate is also, on balance, more likely to accord with
congressional intent. But it is not necessary to consider legislative intent to
adopt this rule. A jurist who refused to consider intent at all could reach the
same result by interpreting the plain meaning of the text and recognizing the
independent virtue of the consistent and coherent development of the law.
The key is that the presumption I suggest would supersede what I contend are
flawed indicators of intent that courts currently infer from congressional
inaction associated with overrides.
The approach I advocate avoids the excesses that are otherwise
encouraged by the rule announced in Gross. As noted, Gross suggests that to
end reliance on Price Waterhouse and to control interpretation of related
statutes, Congress should have amended each and every other discrimination
415. The potential that a given interpretation of federal law will be unworkable or
administratively difficult because of the interrelationship of federal laws is clearly a factor that
courts can legitimately consider when engaging in statutory interpretation. For example, as noted
above, both Justice Kennedy (dissenting in Price Waterhouse) and Justice Stevens (dissenting in
Gross) cited potential confusion among related statutes as significant in their analysis. See supra
notes 192, 247 and accompanying text. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Anti-messiness
Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1800082 (demonstrating that courts frequently cite administrability
concerns as a factor in statutory interpretation). It is less clear that courts should, as a normative
matter, consider potential confusion caused by interpreting federal statutes differently from state
statutes. Clearly, when the language adopted by a relevant legislative body (either Congress or a
state legislature) or surrounding principles of federal or state law merit interpreting statutes
differently, it is appropriate for courts to do so notwithstanding any potential confusion. See supra
text accompanying note 342 (discussing state courts that, prior to the ADA amendments of 2008,
interpreted state disability laws to apply more broadly than did the pre-2008 ADA). That said, it is
obvious from a purely descriptive perspective that Gross has caused widespread confusion
regarding state law. See supra subpart V(B). One benefit of the rule that I propose, even if it is not
a normative justification for the rule, is that it would mitigate this confusion.
416. See, e.g., Ames v. Cartier, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 2d 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (applying the
Title VII mixed-motive standard, including the motivating-factor analysis, to state and local claims
based on statutes in which motivating-factor language was not added following Price Waterhouse).
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and retaliation statute. Institutional realities suggest that it would be quite
hard for Congress to live up to this putative expectation. But even if it did,
this is a second-best result. It requires (or at least makes it quite likely) that
Congress would seek to enact a blanket amendment of all relevant statutes,
because listing or selectively amending some would only increase the
significance ascribed to a failure to list or amend others. Such a global
approach might well sweep in statutes that already include language in
tension with the override. If Congress considered each law individually, it
might choose to except out such statutes, but given the all-or-nothing choice
implicit in a blanket amendment, I think it is likely that Congress would at
least sometimes err on the side of overinclusiveness. My approach, by
contrast, gives courts the interpretive space to consider whether truly
meaningful variation among statutes—e.g., the Rehabilitation Act’s
prohibition of decisions made “solely by reason of” disability417—merits a
different interpretation.
A criticism of my proposal might be that it continues to rely on and trust
courts to do responsible statutory interpretation. If one believes that courts
act primarily to achieve their ideological objectives, then a rebuttable
presumption such as that I suggest will make little difference. This is a risk,
but it guards against the opposite risk that enacting an absolute rule that an
override supersedes preexisting judicial interpretations could permit a
special-interest override to swallow up a general rule.418 More generally,
although there is a significant body of empirical research demonstrating that
ideology plays a role in judicial decision making, it is also well documented
that courts independently care about institutional legitimacy.419 Adoption of
a rule such as that I advocate would shift the default in a way that would, I
believe, often shift judicial behavior. That said, the approach I advocate is
warranted in part because of the danger that the rule announced in Gross
empowers courts to engage in ends-oriented adjudication.
Importantly, the rule itself is ideologically neutral. The rule I propose
would tend to shift the relative balance of power between courts and
Congress to more fully realize Congress’s authority to shape statutory law.
As applied to the particular issue addressed in Gross, application of the rule I
propose would make it easier for plaintiffs in employment discrimination
lawsuits to establish unlawful discrimination. This is a position more
typically favored by Democrats than by Republicans.420 Even in this context,

417. See supra note 409 and accompanying text.
418. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 571–72 (discussing this concern more fully).
419. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
420. The proposed override of Gross was sponsored primarily by Democrats in both the House
and the Senate. See Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 1756, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009) (listing as sponsors Senators Harkin, Leahy, Durbin, Specter, Kohl, Schumer,
Franken, Sanders, Brown, Cardin, Merkley, Feinstein, Dodd, Boxer, Lautenberg, Kaufman, and
Nelson of Florida); Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009) (listing as sponsors Representatives George Miller of California, Conyers,
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it would also make it easier for plaintiffs in “reverse discrimination suits,”
such as challenges to affirmative action programs or diversity-based hiring,
to establish unlawful discrimination,421 and here the typical ideological alignment is reversed. But the more general point is that in other contexts, or at
other times, Congress could be more conservative than the Court, and
applying this rule could support interpretations more typically favored by
conservatives than by liberals.
Acknowledging that ideology can play a role in judicial interpretation
does help underscore that the rebuttable presumption I advocate still places
an onus on Congress to draft overrides clearly and to consider strategies that
minimize the risk that a hydra problem develops. The more concretely
Congress defines the scope of an override, the more completely it controls
judicial interpretation. This is true whether or not courts adopt (or Congress
enacts legislation requiring) the interpretive rule I advocate, although they
are obviously more essential in the absence of the approach I propose. As a
threshold matter, congressional drafters should obviously be aware that
courts may ascribe little or no significance to statements in committee reports
or other legislative history. Therefore, even if it would be institutionally
difficult to amend all potentially affected statutes, it would be prudent for
Congress to enact findings and purposes that explicitly state an intent to
change the interpretation of similar language in related statutes or that
explicitly repudiate prior judicial interpretations. Use of definitional
amendments rather than the addition of separate substantive provisions might
ameliorate the problem (although courts might still consider the absence of a
comparable definition in a related statute grounds to infer that Congress did
not intend the definition to apply to other statutes).422 A more radical
departure from current practice would be to override a prior judicial
interpretation by enacting a joint resolution that does not modify the
preexisting statutory language but clearly—in language passed by both
houses and signed by the President—indicates Congress disagrees with the

Andrews, Nadler of New York, Courtney, Chu, Clarke, Holt, Hare, Kildee, Loebsack, Sablan, Scott
of Virginia, Hirono, Woolsey, Bishop of New York, and Sestak).
421. Cf. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281–83 (1976) (establishing
that “reverse” racial discrimination claims brought by whites are analyzed under the same burdenshifting framework as claims brought by racial minorities).
422. This could be addressed to some extent by enacting a stand-alone definition applicable to
multiple statutes, but that could lead to difficulties similar to those posed by the blanket amendment
considered to override Gross. See supra text accompanying notes 372–77. There is a separate risk
that addressing a specific aspect of the meaning of a more general term would be considered a
purposeful exclusion of other potential meanings of the same general term. For example, as I have
discussed elsewhere, courts have reasoned that Congress’s failure to explicitly mention
breastfeeding when it amended Title VII to add a definition of sex as including “pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions”—an amendment enacted to override a Supreme Court
decision holding that pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination—is reason to conclude
that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of breastfeeding, even though that also
might plausibly be included in a more general understanding of discrimination because of “sex.”
Widiss, supra note 12, at 551–56.
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prior interpretation and sets forth a different (plausible) interpretation of the
preexisting language; this would only be effective, however, if courts in turn
understood such a resolution as compelling the overruling of the disfavored
precedent and requiring reinterpretation of the preexisting language in the
manner Congress dictates.423 To some extent, these drafting strategies could
be used in place of the rule of interpretation I advocate; note, however, that
most would still be ineffective under the reasoning applied in Gross.
Because of this concern, I believe these drafting strategies would be more
effective as supplements to the rule I propose than as alternatives to it.424
Finally, it is crucially important to recognize that once the text of an
override is part of a statute, it informs future interpretation of the statute
more generally. Accordingly, enactment of an override and corollary
presumptions of so-called meaningful variations stemming from an override
may have entirely unforeseen consequences. For example, lower courts have
long been divided regarding how to assess employer liability for decisions
made in reliance on reports or evaluations by biased subordinates (typically
known as “cat’s paw” liability).425 In the past two decades, a wide split
among circuits developed regarding the standard that should be applied under

423. This is particularly complicated for lower courts that cannot legitimately ignore precedent
from a higher court that they consider on point. See Widiss, supra note 12, at 572–74 (fleshing out
this concern and arguing that lower courts should not be bound by overridden aspects of precedent).
Additionally, enactment of a resolution “clarifying” the meaning of prior legislation could raise
complicated retroactivity questions. See Legislation—Declaratory Legislation, 49 HARV. L. REV.
137, 138 & n.3 (1935) (collecting now extremely dated case law applying such declarations
prospectively and asserting retroactive application would raise constitutional concerns). The
Supreme Court has since stated that Congress may generally make an override retroactive without
violating the Constitution but that Congress must enact statutory language expressing this intent
clearly. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313 (1994). Courts presumably would
likewise conclude that a joint resolution that was intended to supersede a prior judicial interpretation
and indicate a different interpretation for preexisting statutory language would be applied
prospectively only, unless the resolution included language explicitly making the resolution
retroactive.
424. This is also important to ensure that overrides Congress enacted prior to Gross are
effective. In some sense, Gross is a result of what could be characterized as a bait and switch on
Congress regarding the significance courts will ascribe to legislative history and the inferences that
would be drawn from “neglect[ing]” to amend all other potentially relevant statutes. Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 85 (1994)
(describing significant changes in courts’ statutory interpretation canons as having a “bait and
switch” quality).
425. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In
the employment discrimination context, ‘cat’s paw’ refers to a situation in which a biased
subordinate, who lacks decision-making power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in a
deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action.”); Sara Atherton Mason, Note,
Cat’s Paw Cases: The Standard for Assessing Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
435, 436–37 (2011) (“The cat’s paw principle derives from a fable . . . in which a monkey
convinces a gullible cat to pull chestnuts from a hot fire. . . . [W]ith subordinate bias liability, the
monkey is the person who convinces the decisionmaker, the cat, to unknowingly engage in
employment discrimination.” (footnotes omitted)).
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a variety of employment discrimination statutes.426 In March 2011, the
Supreme Court first analyzed the question in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.427
This case arose under the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), an Act that, like Title VII, includes
explicit motivating-factor language.428 The Court relied heavily on the
motivating-factor language to hold that liability could be established if the
biased report was a “proximate cause” of the decision, even if the ultimate
“decisionmaker’s exercise of judgment is also a proximate cause of the
employment decision.”429 Prior circuit court decisions had not deemed
the existence of motivating-factor language in Title VII, or its absence in the
ADEA and ADA, significant in their analysis of cat’s paw claims; the
decisions had instead discussed basic agency principles implicit in all
employment discrimination statutes and suggested that a consistent standard
should be employed.430 But, post-Staub, two circuit courts have highlighted
this distinction in holding that a higher standard applies to cat’s paw claims
under the ADEA.431 Similar analysis could be done with respect to the ADA
or any other statute that lacks explicit motivating-factor language.432 On the
other hand, some courts have readily applied Staub to statutes that lack
explicit motivating-factor language,433 further confusing the already muddy
waters left behind by Gross. Such issues will continue to arise unless and
until courts adopt a more realistic and productive approach to interpreting
overrides.

426. BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 484–85 (collecting cases demonstrating the variety of
standards applied by various circuits).
427. 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).
428. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (2006). USERRA probably includes this language because it was
enacted in 1994, when the 1991 CRA and the fight over Price Waterhouse were still fresh in
congressional memories. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-353, § 2, 108 Stat. 3149, 3153 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1)
(2006)).
429. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192.
430. See, e.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 2000)
(collecting and discussing “cat’s paw” cases that analyze derivative liability under the ADEA,
Title VII, and § 1981 in terms of agency principles and not mentioning differences in language
among these statutes).
431. See Wojtanek v. Dist. No. 8, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 435 F.
App’x 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that in cat’s paw cases under the ADEA, a subordinate’s
age-related bias must be “the determinative factor—not just a motivating factor” in the decision to
take adverse action against the plaintiff); Simmons v. Sykes Enters. Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949–50
(10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff must prove that a subordinate’s age-related animus was
the but-for cause of the ultimate decision).
432. See Mark J. Chumley, Cat’s Paw Liability Arguably Not an Option in ADA Cases in the
6th and 10th Circuits, KEATING MUETHING & KLEKAMP PLL (Mar. 18, 2011), http://
www.kmklaw.com/assets/pdf/blogpost_164.pdf (arguing that in addition to ADEA claims, “ADA
claims in the Sixth and Tenth Circuits should also be outside the [Staub] decision since they require
that a disability be the ‘sole reason’ for adverse employment action”).
433. See, e.g., Ordogne v. AAA Tex., LLC, No. H-09-1872, 2011 WL 3438466, at *1, *4 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 5, 2011) (applying Staub in a § 1981 case); Blount v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., No. 1:10-CV01439, 2011 WL 867551, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2011) (applying Staub in a FMLA case).
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VII. Conclusion
Overrides are expected to play a central role in ensuring that Congress
has the power to ascribe meaning to statutory text. The approach taken by
the Supreme Court in Gross undermines this expectation. The Court
interprets Congress’s “neglect[ing]” to amend statutes other than the statute
actually interpreted in the overridden precedent as a license to disregard both
likely congressional intent and prior Court precedent.434 The Court’s putative
expectation that Congress must amend all other statutes to which a disfavored application might be applied is unreasonable. Rather than serving as a
tool for promoting legislative supremacy, enactment of an override, as
interpreted by the Court in Gross, has the perverse effect of aggrandizing the
judicial role. Courts should instead employ a rebuttable presumption that
enactment of an override calls for fresh interpretation of preexisting language
in line with the meaning signaled by Congress, so long as the language can
plausibly bear that interpretation. This approach would better respect the
institutional capabilities of courts and Congress. It furthers the promise of
legislative supremacy and the independent objectives of efficient, consistent,
and fair development of statutory law.

434. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).

